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Abstract
We show existence of equilibria in distributional strategies for a wide class of private
value auctions, including the rst general existence result for double auctions. The set
of equilibria is invariant to the tie-breaking rule. The model incorporates multiple unit
demands, all standard pricing rules, reserve prices, entry costs, and stochastic demand
and supply. Valuations can be correlated and asymmetrically distributed. For double
auctions, we show further that at least one equilibrium involves a positive volume of
trade. The existence proof establishes new connections among existence techniques for
discontinuous Bayesian games.
JEL classication numbers: C62,C63,D44,D82
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1 Introduction
1
Auctions are generally modeled by allowing players to choose from continuum bidding
spaces. However, players' payos in auctions are discontinuous at points of tied bids;
which in the face of continuum bidding spaces makes existence of equilibrium diÆcult
to prove. Much of what is known about existence of equilibrium in auctions comes
from exhibiting equilibrium strategies in symmetric settings (for instance in Milgrom
and Weber [23]) or relying on monotonicity arguments (e.g., Athey [1] or Maskin and
Riley [22]). This leaves open the question of existence of equilibria in many auction
settings, such as those where distributions fail to satisfy nice monotonicity properties,
and settings including the important class of double auctions.
Since the fundamental diÆculty in these proofs revolves around the continuity of the
bid space, one might well ask why one bothers to impose such an assumption. After all,
one could argue that all true bid spaces are in fact discrete. However, continuum bid
spaces are a very useful approximation as they simplify the analysis; allowing, for exam-
ple, one to use calculus to characterize equilibria. Thus, almost all models of auctions
use continuum bid spaces and so it is important to understand when equilibria exist in
such models. Moreover, discrete bid spaces can introduce some pathological equilibria.
For example, both Jackson [10] and Jackson, Simon, Swinkels and Zame ([11], henceforth
JSSZ) show examples where the game with nite bid spaces has an equilibrium, while the
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1
This paper supersedes the second part of Jackson and Swinkels [13]. That paper was split: The
results on existence of equilibria in Bayesian games with type-dependent sharing were combined with
Simon and Zame [33] to become Jackson, Simon, Swinkels, and Zame [11]. The results on existence of
equilibria in a class of private value auctions have evolved into this paper.
continuum game does not. In each, one positive measure set of player types concentrates
on one bid, while another concentrates on the next available bid. This does not strike us
as what we had in mind when discussing equilibrium. Existence of equilibrium with con-
tinuum bidding spaces helps to establish the existence of a non-pathological equilibrium
in the discrete versions of these auctions.
2;3
This paper has three main results about equilibria in auctions: Existence, Invariance,
and Non-Triviality. By existence, of course we mean that the set of equilibria is non-
empty. By Invariance, we mean that the set of equilibria of auctions in our class does
not depend on the precise tie-breaking rule. Invariance actually plays a key role in our
existence proof. And, by non-triviality, we mean that in the set of equilibria there is
always one in which trade occurs with positive probability.
Our existence and invariance results apply to auctions that can be single or double
sided, including settings where players are unsure at the time that they bid whether they
will be net buyers or net sellers. The pricing rule can be quite general, including both the
uniform and discriminatory cases, all pay features, entry costs, reserve prices, and many
other variations. Demands and supplies may be for multiple units, and valuations can
be asymmetrically distributed and follow very general correlation patterns; neither inde-
pendence nor any form of aÆliation is assumed. Finally, in addition to covering standard
tie-breaking rules we also cover more general tie-breaking rules, including allowing the
auctioneer to use information in breaking ties that he is typically not assumed to have,
such as the true values of the players.
In double auctions, showing that an equilibrium exists does not close the issue. The
diÆculty is that double auctions have a degenerate equilibrium in which all buyers bid
0, and all sellers bid v; the upper bound of values.
4
Our second main result establishes
existence of a non-degenerate equilibrium for each auction in our class; that is, one where
trade occurs with positive probability. So, our results are not vacuous in settings where
there exist degenerate no-trade equilibria. Taken together, these two results provide the
rst general existence result of any form for the double auction setting.
5
2
JSSZ also argue that one should be uncomfortable with the equilibria of discrete bid auctions if one
does not know that they correspond to analogs in the continuum, because absent an existence result
for the continuum case, there is no assurance that the equilibrium does not depend on the particular
discretization chosen. For example, it might be critical whether dierent player's available bids overlap
or are disjoint.
3
The underlying existence theorems used (either JSSZ or Reny), include an upper hemi-continuity
result. Hence, the fact (which we establish) that all equilibria of the continuum game are tie-free implies
the existence of almost tie-free equilibria in games with small bid increments.
4
Such no-trade equilibria are notoriously diÆcult to overcome in some other settings. For instance,
see the discussion of positive trade equilibria in market games in Dubey and Shubik [8] and Peck, Shell,
and Spear [25].
5
Williams [37] shows existence in the particular case that the price is determined by the lowest
winning buy bid. This case is easier, because (a) the sellers then have as a weakly dominant strategy to
bid their values and hence (b) the game can be thought of as a one sided auction with a hidden reserve
price schedule, for which degenerate equilibria are not an issue.
2
Our results, and the relation between invariance and existence can be understood as
follows.
First, let us discuss invariance. Let an omniscient tie-breaking rule be a map from bids
and values to distributions over allocations that respects the order of bids. Such maps
include standard tie-breaking rules where ties are broken by some simple randomization
or xed priorities, but also include weirder rules, such as ones where the auctioneer uses
other information such as players' types and, for instance, breaks ties eÆciently. Say
that a tie-breaking rule is trade-maximizing if ties between buyers and sellers are broken
in favor of buyers. Then, the invariance result states that if a strategy prole forms an
equilibrium for one omniscient tie-breaking rule, it remains an equilibrium for any other
trade-maximizing omniscient tie-breaking rule. Two ideas underlie this result. First,
regardless of the tie-breaking rule, given the continuous distribution over types players
will not want to play in such way as to be involved in ties with positive probability (except
that a buyer and a seller may be tied provided trade occurs between them), as otherwise
some player should benet from raising or lowering his bids contingent on some types.
So, changing to some other trade-maximizing tie- breaking rule does not change payos
under the original strategy prole. Second, if a player has an improving deviation relative
to some strategy prole and tie-breaking rule, then there is a slight modication of the
deviation that is still improving and also avoid ties. But then, any improving deviation
at one tie-breaking rule implies an improving deviation under any other tie-breaking rule
as well. Hence, replacing one tie-breaking rule with another does not change the best
replies of the players at the equilibrium.
6
With the invariance result in hand, there are at least three ways to complete the
proof of existence. First, one can use the main result of JSSZ. They prove existence of
equilibria in Bayesian games in which tie-breaking is allowed to be \endogenous" in the
sense that it is determined as part of the equilibrium and can depend (in an incentive
compatible way) on the private information of players. A fortiori this is an equilibrium
with omniscient tie-breaking, and hence, by the invariance result the strategies involved
are also an equilibrium for any trade-maximizing tie-breaking rule including any standard
one.
The invariance result can also be used to establish existence via the theorem of Reny
[27] (henceforth Reny). We know of two such approaches. In one approach, one uses an
auxiliary result of Reny's (Proposition 3.2), involving a condition called reciprocal upper
semicontinuity (due to Simon [31], who generalizes Dasgupta and Maskin [7]). This
requires that if one player's payo jumps down at a discontinuity, some other player's
payo jumps up. Under standard tie-breaking, this condition is not satised (see footnote
13 of Reny). However, if tie-breaking is chosen to maximize the sum of player payos,
then reciprocal upper semicontinuity is satised (as is the stronger condition of Dasgupta
and Maskin). Since such tie-breaking is among the omniscient tie-breaking rules, this
(coupled with invariance) again implies the result.
6
An important precursor to this idea of substitution of tie-breaking rules can be found in Lebrun [18].
3
We use a dierent approach in applying Reny's result, working directly with his main
theorem. We think this approach illustrates an important way of applying Reny's result
more generally, and that it hints at a deeper connection between Reny and JSSZ. Reny's
basic condition, better-reply-security, requires checking that there are paying deviations
not just relative to payos actually available at non-Nash strategy proles, but also rel-
ative to all payos that can be generated as a limit of near-by strategy proles. The
deviation must pay not only relative to the original strategy prole, but to small per-
turbations. The rst part of applying Reny thus involves the potentially daunting task
of characterizing the set of payo proles available from such limits at any given point,
which in particular can be quite complicated at points of discontinuity such as ties. We
show, however, that any such payo prole can be induced by an appropriately chosen
omniscient tie-breaking rule. Then, using the rst idea underlying our invariance result,
that players will play so as to avoid being involved in ties regardless of the tie-breaking
rule, establishes the desired condition. We nd it illuminating that all three routes to
existence rely on some form of omniscient tie-breaking.
7
The last piece of the puzzle is to show that there are non-degenerate (positive trade)
equilibria in settings such as the double auction. Our approach is to \seed" the auction
with a non-strategic player who is present with small probability, and who then makes
buy or sell bids uniform over the range of values. With this extra player present, it no
longer makes sense for buyers to always oer 0, or sellers to always ask v; since such bids
never trade, while one could bid more generously, and sometimes protably trade with
the non-strategic player. What is less clear is that this implies an amount of trade that
does not vanish as the probability of the non-strategic player being present goes to 0.
The key is to show that once the non-strategic player is present, competition to trade
with him will push the bids of buyers with high values well above 0 and sellers with low
values well below v: Essentially then, the extra player sets o a cascade, resulting in a
positive amount of trade even as the probability that the extra player is present vanishes.
Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 presents our private-value auction
setting. Section 4.1 shows that the set of equilibria in such auctions are invariant to the
tie-breaking rule. In Section 4.2, we show how invariance implies existence of equilibria
for the auctions in our class. Section 5 shows that these equilibria can be chosen to have
non-degenerate trade in auction environments where no-trade equilibria are a possibility,
such as double auctions. An appendix contains the proofs.
2 Related Literature
The method of proof we use for our rst result, of demonstrating existence with an non-
standard tie-breaking rule and then showing that the tie-breaking can be changed to
a standard one, is reminiscent of Maskin and Riley [22].
8
The strategy of Maskin and
7
This is also true of Lebrun [18] and Maskin and Riley [22].
8
This technique is also used by JSSZ who argue that if valuations are private and the distribution is
atomless and satises some other continuity conditions, then there exists an equilibrium in a rst-price
4
Riley's proof is to consider a sequence of auctions with nite bid spaces, in which, in the
event of a tie, a Vickrey auction takes place. For the auctions they consider, the Vickrey
auction is enough to guarantee that payos are preserved in the limit as the nite grid of
bids grows ne. They then argue that these ties would never occur in equilibrium anyway,
and so the equilibrium is in fact a standard one. So, like them, we show existence in a
game where one does something strange in the event of a tie and then work backward
to show that in many cases of interest this was irrelevant, in our case, by applying our
invariance result. Within the class of private value auctions, we cover a substantially
broader set of cases than those of Maskin and Riley, essentially because our tie-breaking
methods allow for potentially stranger rules. This allows us to handle equilibrium where
bidding is not monotone in type, and thus to cover a wide variety of auction formats and
information structures not handled in the previous literature. On the other hand, Maskin
and Riley's results hold for some non-private value auctions (with aÆliated types) while
our result does not. It is an open question how far techniques like those in this paper
extend beyond private value auctions.
As discussed above, the idea of getting existence in games with augmented message
spaces is also related to Lebrun [18], who looks at rst price single unit private value
auctions in which bids are augmented by messages which turn out to be irrelevant. He
notes that in augmenting the game, and letting tie-breaking depend on the message sent,
he is doing something reminiscent of what Simon and Zame [32] do in games of complete
information.
9
Thus, in the specic setting he studies, Lebrun's technique parallels the
one we use here.
This paper is also related to the literature on existence in games with continuum
type spaces, including, for example, Dasgupta and Maskin [7], Simon [31], and of course
Reny [27]. Reny shows that his condition applies in a multiple unit, private value, pay
your bids auction, a case for which we also prove existence (see his Example 5.2). A
recent working paper by Bresky [4] uses a dierent line of attack to apply Reny's result
to private value auctions. Neither paper covers the class of settings covered here.
Of course, none of the previous literature has anything to say about the problem of
no-trade equilibria in double auctions.
Thus we move beyond the previous literature in four ways:
1. We show a broad invariance property across tie-breaking rules for the equilibria of
private value auctions.
2. We show that the invariance property and consideration of non-standard tie-breaking
allows for the straightforward application of either JSSZ or Reny. The way in which
these results can be leveraged should be interesting in its own right and potentially
of wider applicability.
auction with standard tie-breaking (see their Example 3).
9
The idea of using messages to restore limit continuity in a nite approximation setting should also
be credited to Manelli [21], who uses such messages to restore equilibria in innite signaling games.
5
3. This provides an existence result for private value auctions that covers substantially
more ground than previous results, even in the single auction case.
4. Finally, we show there always exists an equilibrium in which there is a positive prob-
ability of trade. This overcomes the problem of no-trade equilibria, and provides
the rst existence result of any form for double auctions.
10
A number of papers approach the existence question in single unit auctions by exam-
ining the associated set of dierential equations. A strength of this approach as compared
to ours is that it allows for interesting comparative static and uniqueness results. Such
an approach requires much more structure regarding the distributions of valuations than
we require here. For some leading examples, see Milgrom and Weber [23], Lebrun [19],
Bajari [2], and Lizzeri and Persico [17].
Athey [1] considers conditions on games such that a monotone comparative statics
result applies to the best bid of a player as his signal varies. Essentially, one imposes a
condition under which, if all of i's opponents are using an increasing strategy, i has a best
response in increasing strategies. A strength of Athey's result is that it does not rest on
private values. It does however, require a single dimensional type space with something
akin to the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP, see Example 1). Recent work
by McAdams [20] and Kazumori [15] extends this to a multiple dimensional setting with
independent types, in the former case with a discrete bid space, while in the later, with
a continuum.
Each of the auction papers mentioned above derives the existence of pure strategy
equilibria, while in general we show only the existence of equilibria in distributional
strategies. This is partly due to the methods we employ, but mostly due to the broadness
of the class of distributions of valuations that we admit. In particular (see Example 2
below) not all auctions in our setting have such pure strategy equilibria, and so a result
covering these auctions can at most claim existence of mixed strategy equilibria. In
some settings with positively related valuations, one can start from our existence result
and then independently deduce that all equilibria must be in increasing (and therefore
essentially pure) strategies. We present one such result, generalizing McAdams and
Kazumori for the case of private values.
11
See Reny and Zamir [28] and Krishna [16] for
other interesting recent work on pure strategy equilibria.
10
Since the rst writing of this paper (1999), others have also looked at existence of equilibrium in
double auctions. Fudenberg, Mobius, and Szeidl [9] show existence of equilibrium in double auctions
with suÆciently many players. Perry and Reny [26] address existence in double auctions with a discrete
bid space. These papers all work in a symmetric aÆliated or conditionally independent setting, and
derive increasing equilibria. Our setting has neither symmetry nor aÆliation, but does not rule out that
the equilibria found involve mixing.
11
With independent types, these papers can deal with interdependent values, which we do not. We
would like to be clear that while our basic existence results for equilibria in distributional strategies
(including non-trivial equilibria in double auctions) predate McAdams and Kazumori's, our corollary on
pure strategy equilibria postdates theirs, and, indeed is partly motivated by their work.
6
3 The Setting and a Class of Auctions
We begin by presenting our model of private value auctions. The model treats single and
double auctions (as well as hybrids) in a single framework.
3.1 The Setting
Let us rst describe the setting in terms of the players, objects, valuations, and uncer-
tainty.
Players
There are players N = f1;    ; ng, along with a non-strategic \player" 0, who can act
as the seller, for example, in a single sided auction.
Objects and Endowments
There is ` < 1 such that each player i 2 N [ f0g has an endowment of e
i
2
f0; 1; : : : ; `g indivisible objects. Objects are identical. Let e = (e
0
; e
1
; : : : ; e
n
) denote the
vector of endowments.
Valuations
Each player i 2 N desires at most ` objects. Player i's valuations are represented by
v
i
= (v
i1
; : : : ; v
i`
). The interpretation is that i has marginal value v
ih
for an h
th
object.
Assumption 1: (Private Values) Player i receives value
P
H
h=1
v
ih
from having H objects.
For h  e
i
; we say that v
ih
is a sell value. For h > e
i
, we say that v
ih
is a buy value.
Let v = (v
1
; : : : ; v
n
) be the vector of valuations of the players.
Types
We say that 
i
= (e
i
; v
i
) is the type of player i, and let  = (e; v) denote the vector of
types of all players. Let 
i
 f0; 1; : : : ; `g  IR
`
be the space of possible types for player
i.
12
Let  = 
0
    
n
be the space of type vectors.
Assumption 2: (Compact Type Space)  is compact.
12
We will generally ignore the valuations of the non-strategic \0" player.
7
Let v be such that   f0; 1; : : : ; `g
n+1
 [ v; v]
(n+1)`
.
Uncertainty
The vector  2  is drawn according to a (Borel) probability measure P on . The
marginal of P on 
i
is denoted P
i
; i 2 f0; : : : ; ng. Without loss of generality, take 
i
to
be the support of P
i
.
Assumption 3: (Imperfect Correlation) P is absolutely continuous with respect to
Q
n
i=0
P
i
; with continuous Radon-Nikodym derivative f .
A3 puts no restriction on how e
i
and v
i
are related, or on the relationship between any
two values v
ih
and v
ih
0
for any given player. It simply imposes that (e
i
; v
i
) and (e
j
; v
j
) are
not too dependent. For instance, in a two-player, one-object auction, if P were uniform
on the diagonal fv j v
11
= v
21
g ; then v
1
and v
2
would be perfectly correlated and P would
not be absolutely continuous with respect to P
1
P
2
(the uniform distribution on [0; 1]
2
).
On the other hand, under A3 types can be \almost perfectly correlated" in the sense
that P can place probability one on some small neighborhood of the diagonal.
Assumption 4: (Atomless Distributions) P
i
(fv
ih
= xg) = 0 for all i 2 N , h 2
f1; : : : ; `g, and x 2 [ v; v]:
This assumption rules out that particular values occur with positive probability. It is
stronger than just assuming that P
i
is atomless as it rules out, for example, that v
i1
 1
while v
i2
is distributed uniformly on [0; 1]. It allows, however, v
ih
= v
ih
0
with probability
one.
We emphasize that we have not imposed any sort of aÆliation among dierent players'
values and so the following example is within our setting. Because this auction does not
have an equilibrium in non-decreasing strategies, it is not covered by any previous paper
on existence in auctions.
Example 1 Consider a two-player, private-value, rst-price auction. Values are uni-
formly distributed over the triangle
f(v
1
; v
2
)jv
1
 0; v
2
 0; 1  v
1
+ v
2
g :
Here, higher values of v
1
correspond to lower expectations of v
2
, and vice versa. This
auction has no non-decreasing pure strategy Nash equilibrium. To see why not, suppose to
the contrary that such an equilibrium b
1
(); b
2
() exists. Let us rst argue that v
2
 b
2
(v
2
)
for all v
2
2 [0; 1). Suppose not, so that b
2
(v
0
2
) > v
0
2
for some v
0
2
2 [0; 1). Then, since b
2
is
non-decreasing, b
2
(v
2
) > v
2
for all v
2
2 (v
0
2
; b
2
(v
0
2
)) : But, then, since P (vjv
1
< v
2
; v
2
2
8
(v
0
2
; b
2
(v
0
2
))) > 0; it must be that there is a positive probability that at least one of the
players wins with a bid above value,
13
and so would do strictly better to lower his bid
to value. This contradicts equilibrium. Now consider a bid by bidder i when his value
is above 1   ". He knows that the other bidder's value is below ", and thus so are the
other bidder's bids. Thus, i's bids should be no more than ", and so i's bids for values
near 1 are near 0. Therefore, the only possible equilibrium in non-decreasing strategies
is b
1
(v
1
) = b
2
(v
2
) = 0 for all (v
1
; v
2
); which is clearly not an equilibrium.
Assumption 5: (Non-Increasing Marginal Valuations)
P (f(e; v)jv
ih
 v
i;h+1
8i; hg) = 1:
A5 simply states that each player's marginal valuations for objects are non-increasing
in the number of objects. This makes our life easier in terms of keeping track of incentives.
In particular, with increasing marginal valuations, a player might nd himself submitting
the same rst and second bids, and simultaneously wishing he could lower his rst bid
because he dislikes winning one object, but raise his second bid because he likes winning
two objects. A related and fuller discussion follows Assumption 9. Whether equilibria
still exist in such situations is an open question.
3.2 The Class of Auctions
We consider auctions where each player submits a vector of bids, one for each potential
object that they may buy or sell. Of course, the auction mechanism may ignore some of
this information, but we allow for the possibility that it is used.
Bidding and Reserve Prices
For each i 2 f0; : : : ; ng, a bid b
i
2 IR
`
is a non-increasing vector of ` numbers. We
assume that there exist real numbers b <

b such that the set of allowable bid vectors for
i is
B
i
= [b; b]
`
:
Let B denote the set of admissible bid vectors, B = B
0
 B
1
     B
n
.
The requirement that bid vectors be non-increasing is simply a labeling statement,
as bids can always be re-ordered in this manner. It will be consistent with how auctions
process bids, in the sense that higher bids are given priority.
13
Either player 2 wins for at least some values of v
2
2 (v
0
2
; b
2
(v
0
2
)) or else player 1 must be outbidding
2 even when v
1
is lower than v
2
.
9
For most sensible auctions, the spaces B
i
include the compact support of the v
i
's and
bids outside of that range are weakly dominated. For example, in discriminatory as well
as uniform price auctions, a bid b
ih
above v
ih
is weakly dominated by a bid at v
ih
. In an
all pay auction, a bid above v
ih
is weakly dominated by bidding 0. In these settings, one
is making no extra restriction on bidder's behavior in imposing the existence of b.
14
In
settings where there is a highest sensible bid for a buyer, allowing sell bids above that
amount is a convenient way to let a seller \sit out" of the auction, and similarly when
there is a lowest sensible bid for sellers.
Timing
The non-strategic player moves rst, and the remaining players then move simulta-
neously. So, at time 0, b
0
is announced, then at time 1 each player i 2 N observes 
i
and
submits a bid b
i
.
15;16;17
Payments
The payment that a player makes or receives depends on the number of objects
bought or sold. We require that conditional on the number of units that i is allocated, and
conditional on the endowment vector, his payment varies continuously as a function of the
vector of submitted bids. Thus, there are continuous functions t
i
: f0; : : : ; `g
n+2
B ! IR;
such that i's payment is t
i
(h; e; b) in the case where the bid prole is b; the endowment
vector is e, and he receives h objects.
18
14
For an example in which optimal buy bids may not be bounded from above, consider a third price
auction with three players. Suppose that player 3 happens to always bid between 0 and 1, and that
player 1 and 2 have values that are always at least 2. Then, each of player 1 and player 2 would like any
bid he makes to always exceed any bid by the other player. So, optimal bids (at least in some scenarios)
are unbounded.
For an example in which optimal buy bids may not be bounded from below, consider an auction in
which players each demand two units, and in which k units are for sale. The price is a convex combination
of the k and k+1st highest bids, with the weight on the k-th being a strictly increasing function of the
average bid. Then, a bidder with a low second value might well nd it optimal to submit a rst bid near
his rst value, but make his second bid arbitrarily negative.
15
While treated identically to other bid vector's, b
0
can be thought of as 0's reserve price vector. In
order to have player 0 not participate in the auction at all (for instance in a double auction) we can
simply set e
0
= 0 and b
0h
= b for all h, in which case all of 0's bids are non-competitive.
16
Secret reserve prices are handled by having player 1 have the only positive endowment, so that player
1 is the seller and his bid is the secret reserve.
17
Note that we are considering the game having xed b
0
, and not the game in which b
0
is chosen
strategically. It follows from Theorem 2 of JSSZ that the set of equilibria of the game dened by b
0
with
omniscient tie-breaking is upper hemi-continuous in b
0
: By Theorem 9 below, every such equilibrium is
an equilibrium under standard tie-breaking. Hence, the set of Nash equilibria of the game induced by
b
0
is upper hemi-continuous. It follows that there is also an equilibrium of the game in which buyer 0
chooses b
0
according to some objective.
18
The way in which we have dened t includes a specication of payments for b and h where in fact
it is not consistent for i to receive h objects given b. This is a notational convenience.
10
Note that the assumption of continuity here is consistent with the discontinuities
present in an auction setting. This is because t
i
(h; e; b) only says what i would pay if i
were to receive h objects. A change in bids can still change how many objects i gets,
say from h to h + 1, and thus can still lead to a discontinuous change in payments. For
example, in a rst price auction, t
i
(1; 0; b) = b
i
and t
i
(0; 0; b) = 0; both of which are
clearly continuous even though the payment as a function of bids accounting for ties and
changes in the number of objects received is not continuous.
Typically (but not always, as illustrated by Example (4) below), t
i
(h; e; b) will have
the same sign as i's net trade, h  e
i
.
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Payoffs
Players evaluate the outcome of the auction via von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions. This allows for risk-averse, risk-loving, or any of a variety of other sorts of
preferences.
Assumption 6: (Expected Utility) Player i 2 N has a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function U
i
over her net payo. U
i
is continuous, strictly increasing and has a rst
derivative that is bounded away from 0 and 1.
A6 implies that there exists  <1 such that U
0
(x)=U
0
(y) <  for all x and y:
So, a player's utility when receiving h objects in the nal allocation when the bid
vector is b and the endowment is e is described by
U
i
0
@
0
@
X
h
0
h
v
ih
0
1
A
  t
i
(h; e; b)
1
A
;
where U
i
is a continuous von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
3.3 Examples and a Preview of Our Results on a Narrower
Class of Auctions
The general development that follows is involved given the breadth of the class of auctions
handled and the attention paid to allocations and tie-breaking rules. Thus, we oer some
19
An important point about the way in which we have formulated the payment rule is that player i's
payment can depend on his own allocation but does not further depend on other players' allocations,
such as which players other than i won. Without this assumption, an entirely new and tricky set of
discontinuities arise. For example, even though player i might happen not to be involved in a tie, small
changes in his bid might aect which of two opponents wins a tie (remember that an omniscient tie-
breaking rule allows for this possibility). If this results in a change in the payment rule i faces, then his
payos may change discontinuously despite the fact that his bid is not involved in any ties.
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examples of auctions covered by our existence results and a preview of some of the results
for a narrower class of auctions. This class still includes most standard auction formats.
Although our statements here should be clear, we refer the reader to the subsequent
sections for the formal and more general statements of our results.
We emphasize that in all of the examples that follow there is no assumption about
symmetry of the distribution of the players' endowments, valuations, or utility functions.
(1) A standard rst price single unit auction.
In terms of our denitions and notation this is expressed as follows. There is one
object sold by player 0, and so ` = 1 and the distribution over endowments is such
that Pr(fe = (1; 0; : : : ; 0)g) = 1. The payments are such that an agent pays his bid
if he wins an object (t
i
(1; e; b) = b
i1
) and nothing otherwise (t
i
(0; e
i
; b) = 0). The
reserve price is b
01
= 0. Let C  fi 2 N jb
i1
 b
j1
for all j 2 N [ f0gg (the set of
players who submitted the highest bid). Then, the allocation rule gives the object
to player i 2 N with probability 1=#C if i is in C and 0 otherwise. If C is empty
(so that no player other than 0 bids at least 0), then player 0 retains the object.
Note that because the seller submits a bid at 0; a negative bid by any other player
never wins. Hence, such bids are simply a way for players to express that they have
no interest in winning.
(2) A standard rst price single unit auction with a known reserve price, r  0.
This is the same as Example (1), except that player 0 sets a reserve price b
01
= r.
(3) A single unit Vickrey (second price) auction.
This is as in (1) or (2), except that the payment rule for a winning bidder changes to
t
i
(1; e; b) = b
2
, where b
2
is the second highest bid submitted (including the reserve
price b
01
= r).
(4) An unfair auction.
This is the same as any of the above examples except that some players pay only
some fraction of the payments indicated above when they win while other players'
payments are unchanged.
(5) An auction with entry costs (and a reserve price).
Let c  0 be the entry cost incurred by a player wishing to make a bid, where the
decision of whether and how to bid is made without knowing other players' entry
decisions. This is handled in our model as follows. The setting is as in (1), (2), or
(3), except that t
i
(0; e; b) = c minfb
i1
+1; 1g and t
i
(1; e; b) = c minfb
i1
+ 1; 1g+ b
i1
for the rst price version (with t
i
(1; e; b) = c minfb
i1
+1; 1g+ b
2
g for a second price
auction).
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The form of t
i
(0; ) is chosen so that the function is continuous and satises our
assumptions. Eectively, sending a bid of  1 means that the player stays out of
the auction and does not pay the cost c, whereas sending any bid b
i
 0 incurs the
cost c of participating. The remaining bids between -1 and 0 are bids that would
never be used in equilibrium since they cannot win an object (given a reserve price
of r  0) and yet would incur some bidding cost. Thus, the presence of the bids
that lie above -1 and below 0 is just a technical device in this example.
(6) An all pay auction (and various implementations of the war of attrition).
A rst price all pay auction is the same as in (1) except that t
i
(0; e; b) = t
i
(1; e; b) =
b
i
. In the standard war of attrition the winner pays the second highest bid and so
t
i
(1; e; b) = b
2
as in (2), while t
i
(0; e; b) = b
i
.
(7) A rst-price procurement auction.
Here ` = 1 and player 0 has e
0
= 0: Thus, setting b
01
> 0 represents the maximum
amount that 0 will pay for an object. Each player i > 0 has e
i
= 1. The lowest
bidder among i > 0 sells an object to player 0 provided the bid is no more than b
01
(with ties among players i > 0 broken in any way). The payment if an object is
sold by i to 0 is t
i
(0; e; b) =  b
i1
. That is, the buyer pays b
i1
to the winning seller.
Otherwise payments are 0. The obvious variation leads to a second-price version
of a procurement auction.
20
(8) A multi-unit discriminatory (pay-your-bid) auction
Take ` > 1 and Pr(fe = (`; 0; : : : ; 0)g) = 1. The top ` bids are declared winners,
and payments are t
i
(h; e; b) =
P
h
w=1
b
iw
.
(9) A multi-unit uniform price auction
As in (8), except that winning players pay the ` + 1-st highest bid for each unit
they acquire, so t
i
(h; e; b) = hb
`+1
, where b
`+1
is the `+ 1-th highest bid.
21;22
(10) A standard double auction.
Players 1 through n
b
are potential buyers having e
i
= 0. Players n
b
+ 1 through
n = n
b
+ n
s
are potential sellers having e
i
= 1. Ties between a buyer and a seller
are broken in favor of trade, and ties among buyers or among sellers are broken
randomly. Let p =

b
0
+ b
00

=2; where b
0
is the n
s
-th highest bid, and b
00
the n
s
+1-
th. Then, t
i
(0; e; b) =  pe
i
; while t
i
(1; e; b) = p(1  e
i
):
20
Extensions to multi-unit procurement auctions are also easily handled.
21
There are many variations on ways to select the price paid, including some that ensure that a player's
losing bid does not end up setting the price he pays for his winning bids (such as that suggested by
Vickrey [36]). The particulars of how the price is chosen and even whether it diers across players will
not matter, as our theorem will apply in any case.
22
Examples (8) and (9) cover the class of private value auctions examined in Swinkels ([34], [35]), and
Jackson and Kremer [12].
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(11) A generalized double auction.
Players 0 through n draw a realization of (e
i
; v
i
), and submit bid vectors. Ob-
jects are allocated to the
P
n
i=0
e
i
highest players, with tie-breaking as in (9). Let
t
i
(h; e; b) = p (h  e
i
), where p is a weakly increasing and continuous function of the
(
P
n
i=0
e
i
)-th and (
P
n
i=0
e
i
) + 1-th highest bids. Note that players may turn out to
be buyers or sellers, even for a given realization of their own type vector, depending
on how their bid vector compares to those of other players.
(12) A double discriminatory auction.
This is the same as (11), except for the payments. If a player ends up as a net
buyer with h objects, he pays
P
h
h
0
=e
i
+1
b
ih
0
. If i ends up as a net seller, he receives
P
e
i
h
0
=h+1
b
ih
0
: The auctioneer (player 0) pockets the dierence.
Theorem 2 Each of the auctions described above has an equilibrium in distributional
strategies which have support in the closure of the set of undominated strategies.
In one-sided auctions (or more generally, any auction where there is a non-strategic
seller with a reserve below v); the equilibrium above will automatically have trade. When
there is no non-strategic seller, this is less clear. For example in a double auction, there
may exist degenerate equilibria where all sellers bid at the top of the support of values
and buyers bid at the bottom.
Existence of equilibria with a positive probability of trade is guaranteed with two
additional assumptions. First, we require that changing one player's type does not alter
the support of types for another. In particular, we assume that the Radon-Nikodym
derivative of P with respect to 
i
P
i
is always positive. Second, we assume that there is
some competition for gains from trade. It is enough to have the support of buyer and
sellers' valuations overlap for all h and to have either at least two buyers or at least two
sellers. A weaker condition is described in Section 5.
Theorem 3 Under the above-mentioned assumptions, each of the auctions described
above has an equilibrium that has support in the closure of the set of undominated strate-
gies and has a positive probability of trade.
3.4 The General Class of Auctions: Allocations and Tie-Breaking
Rules
We now return to the formal denitions of allocations and tie-breaking, which are needed
in the full statement of our results and to complete a description of the class of auctions
that we consider.
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Allocations
An allocation is a vector a 2 f0; `g
n+1
 A. The component a
i
is the number of
objects that are allocated to player i.
Consistent Allocations
An allocation is consistent with vectors of endowments and bids (e; b) if
n
X
i=0
a
i
=
n
X
i=0
e
i
:
and
fb
jh
0
> b
ih
and a
i
 hg ) a
j
 h
0
:
The rst condition is simply a balance condition, requiring that all objects be ac-
counted for. Note that this allows for the possible interpretation that objects that are
allocated to the 0 player might be \unsold," for instance in the case where player 0 is
the only seller in an auction.
The second condition simply says that if i receives at least h  1 objects and j's
h
0
-th bid exceeds i's h
th
, then j must get at least h
0
objects. Thus, higher bids are given
priority over lower bids in allocating objects.
23
Let C(e; b)  A denote the set of consistent allocations given endowment and bid
vectors (e; b).
Ties
Say that there is a tie given (e; b) if there exist a and a
0
in C(e; b) such that a 6= a
0
.
Say the tie is at b

if
# fi; hjb
ih
> b

g <
n
X
i=0
e
i
; and
# fi; hjb
ih
 b

g >
n
X
i=0
e
i
:
So, in the event of a tie at b

, all bids above b

are lled, but there is some discretion
in to whom to allocate objects at b

. Thus, for instance, it is not a tie if there are two
23
In some auctions, some players enjoy a special status. For example, some of the PCS auctions
subsidized bids by minority owned rms (see Cramton [5]). One way of implementing this would be to
declare the minority rm a winner if its bid is at least, say, 2/3 of the highest bid. We instead include
asymmetries by insisting on the highest bid winning, but allowing payment rules to dier, so that, for
example, the minority rm pays only 2/3 of its submitted bid.
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objects for sale, bidder one has the highest bid, and bidder two has two identical bids
which are the next-highest. Here bidder two has the \tied" bids, but will always get one
object in any allocation.
Tie-Breaking Rules
As discussed in the introduction, we prove existence for a very wide class of tie-
breaking rules, including some fairly strange ones. In particular, we allow for the pos-
sibility that the auctioneer uses more information than just bids and endowments in
determining allocations.
An omniscient tie-breaking rule is a (measurable) function o :   B ! (A) such
that o(e; v; b) places probability one on the set of consistent allocations C(e; b). We let
o(e; v; b)[a] denote the probability of allocation a under o at (e; v; b); and o
i
(e; v; b)[h]
denote the probability that i is allocated h objects under o at (e; v; b).
24
Given the requirement of consistency, o only has any discretion where there are tied
bids, and hence the term \tie-breaking rule" is appropriate.
Let standard tie breaking be the particular tie-breaking rule which is dened as fol-
lows. Consider a tie at b

: First, allocate an object to each bid that is strictly above
b

. Next, allocate an object with equal probability to each player who has an unlled
buy bid at b

: Repeat until all objects are gone, or until there are no unlled buy bids
at b

. At this point, iteratively allocate any remaining objects one at a time with equal
probability to those players who have an unlled sell bid at b

:
The two key aspects of standard tie-breaking are rst that the rule is trade-maximizing,
and second that a bidder's chance of winning an h
th
object at b

does not depend on i's
other bids. This would be false, if, for example, one simply randomly assigned remaining
objects equiprobably over all bids at b

; as then an h + 1
st
bid of b

would increase the
chance that i receives object h:
While we were led to consider omniscient tie-breaking rules for their use as an in-
termediate step in the proof of existence, it also strikes us that there may be situations
in which tie-breaking that depends on more than just bids might be appropriate. For
example, the government may have objectives beyond those of revenues that would push
them to favor one player over another in the event of a tie. In this value setting, we will
24
Imagine the auctioneer had access to some other information, possibly correlated with player type,
but unobservable to the players at the time they bid. Allowing the auctioneer to also condition on
this information in breaking ties would not expand the set of equilibria beyond those achieved with
omniscient tie-breaking: from the point of view of the players, this is equivalent to the auctioneer simply
randomizing in a way that depends on the types and bids of the players.
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see that ties never occur anyway, so any extra information available to the auctioneer
turns out to be irrelevant. It is an open question whether meaningful ties occur in other
settings, and whether the possibility of favoritism etc., would have an interesting eect
in those settings.
Competitive Ties and Trade Maximization
It should be noted that not all ties are the same. On the one hand is a situation in
which two buyers are tied at a given bid, and only one of them receives an object. As we
will show, at least one player will always have an incentive to deviate in this situation.
Consider on the other hand, a situation in which a single buyer and a single seller make
a tied bid, but the object is transferred from buyer to seller at a price under which both
are happy to trade. Here, C(e; b) has more than one element, since it is also consistent
for trade not to occur. But, since the object is actually transferred, there is no incentive
for either player to change their bid.
Let us say that (e; b) has a competitive tie if there exists a p such that the number of
buy bids that are greater than or equal to p is not the same as the number of sell bids
that are less than or equal to p.
It turns out that while equilibrium conditions will naturally rule out competitive ties,
non-competitive ties may occur in equilibrium. In particular, it is possible that a buyer
and seller have a tied bid. As long as trade always occurs in this situation, this is not
inconsistent with equilibrium. This is captured in the following condition.
A tie-breaking rule o is trade-maximizing at (v; e; b) if the rule does not specify an
allocation in which one player has an unlled buy bid at b and another has an unaccepted
sell bid at b.
25
A tie-breaking rule o is trade-maximizing if it is trade-maximizing at every
(v; e; b).
We will be working with distributional strategies (see Section 3.5 for details). Given
a probability measure m on  B, say that the rule o is eectively trade-maximizing if
it is trade-maximizing on a set of (v; e; b) having measure 1 under m. So, given the way
in which types are drawn and players randomize over bids, the probability that there is
a non-trade maximizing tie is zero.
The next example illustrates the importance of the trade-maximization in our invari-
ance result.
25
This includes player 0: So, for example, it is only necessary to meet a reserve price, not strictly beat
it.
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Example 4 There is a buyer with a valuation for a single unit uniformly drawn from
[3; 4]; and a seller with a valuation for a single unit for sale and value uniformly drawn from
[0; 1]; where values are independent across players. The price is the midpoint between
the bids.
If in the event of a tie between a buy and sell bid the auction mechanism species
that trade should occur, then it is an equilibrium for both players to bid 2, and for trade
to always occur if both players bid 2. This rule is eectively trade maximizing. If instead
the auction mechanism species that in the event of a tie, trade occurs with a probability
 < 1, then this is no longer an equilibrium. Now a buyer would benet by slightly raise
his bid, or a seller would benet from slightly lowering her bid. In fact, now there is no
longer any equilibrium in which trade always occurs. To see this, suppose the contrary.
Then, almost every bid by the buyer must exceed almost every bid by the seller. But
then, a bid near the bottom of the support of buyer's bids wins almost always, and so
does strictly better than a higher bid. Thus, the buyer must be making the same bid b
B
,
regardless of valuation. Similarly, the seller must be making the same bid b
S
, regardless
of value. Suppose that b
S
< b
B
: Then, a seller can raise his bid and still almost always
sell at a better price, a contradiction. Hence b
S
= b
B
= p for some p: But this is a
contradiction since the supposition is that trade occurs with probability  < 1 at a tie.
Payments and Bids
We need to say something about how bids determine payments. First, we require that
for any given allocation, a player who is a net buyer is weakly better o to have submitted
lower bids, and a player who is a net seller is weakly better o to have submitted higher
bids. Of course, this is holding the allocation constant. Such a change in bid may well
result in the loss of a protable trade. Second, we will require that if one is a net seller,
one's buy bids do not matter, and vice versa.
Assumption 7: (Monotonicity) For any i, and h  e
i
, t
i
(h; e; b) is non-decreasing in b
ih
0
for h
0
> e
i
and constant in b
ih
for h
0
 e
i
; and if h < e
i
then t
i
(h; e; b) is non-increasing
in b
ih
0
for h
0
 e
i
; and constant in b
ih
0
for h
0
> e
i
:
Note that the condition does not impose any requirements about how a player's
payment depends on the bids of others.
Having buy payments be independent of sell bids, and vice versa, is useful in our
weak domination arguments (for instance Lemma 5 below), and also in establishing the
existence of positive trade (Theorem 15).
Payments at Ties
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The following condition on payments is critical to our results. It says that one's
marginal payment when one's h
th
bid is involved in a tie is a function only of e
i
; h; and
b
ih
: One's other bids, and the details of how many other players one is tied with, and
what their other bids were, are irrelevant.
Assumption 8: (Known Marginal Transfers at Ties) For all i, h, and e
i
, there is p
ihe
i
:
[b;

b] ! IR such that if (h; e; b) is such that there is a tie at b
ih
, then t
i
(h; e; b)   t
i
(h  
1; e; b) = p
ihe
i
(b
ih
).
This condition is generally satised and easy to check. For instance, for discriminatory
auctions, uniform price auctions, and all double auctions (where the price is set in the
range of market clearing prices for the submitted demand and supply curves), p
ih
(b
ih
) =
b
ih
.
26;27
It is also satised for an all pay auction, where the dierence in payments does
not depend on whether the player gets an object and so p
ih
(b
ih
) = 0. It is not satised
for a third price auction for a single unit, since then, even if the rst two bids are tied,
the price paid may vary depending on the third bid.
Our invariance results do not hold when marginal transfers might be decreasing in h:
This eectively induces a volume discount, which creates much the same phenomenon as
an upward sloping demand curve: at some bid vectors where the player's two bids are
tied, the player will be unhappy to win a single object, but happy to win two.
Assumption 9: (Monotonic Marginal Payments) For each i; e
i
; p
ihe
i
(b) is non-decreasing
in h:
This assumption is trivially satised where p
ihe
i
(b) = b or p
ihe
i
(b) = 0.
To see an example where in the absence of such a condition one might get a rather
odd equilibrium and how this might depend on the tie-breaking rule, consider a case in
which each of three players has marginal value 4 for 2 objects. Half the time, one object
is available, and half the time, four. Assume that payment rules are such that, when
there is a tie at a bid of b

; a player pays 6 for a rst unit and 1 for a second. Then, it is
an equilibrium for all three players to bid (b

; b

) always, as long as tie breaking is that
when there is a tie and a single object, each player receives the object one third of the
time, while when there is a tie and four objects, each player receives two objects with
probability two thirds, and no object with probability one third. Then, by submitting
(b

; b

) ; a player earns
1
2

1
3
(4  6) +
2
3
(8  6)

=
1
3
:
26
Note that in a double auction where a player has a single unit to sell and b
i
is in a tie, t
i
(0; 1; b
i
) =  b
i
and t
i
(1; 1; b
i
) = 0: So, p
i1
= 0  ( b
i
) = b
i
:
27
This also holds for Vickrey auctions where the price is the highest bid among other players. Note
that in the case of a tie, since that requires that there must be some discretion in the awarding of objects,
the highest non-winning bid among others must also be tied.
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Consider any deviation in which a player raises either his rst bid or both bids. By the
rules of consistent allocations, this must have him always being allocated the object when
there is only one, and paying at least 6. In the most favorable case, it always has him
also win two objects whenever there are four available. Hence, he earns at most
1
2
(4  6) +
1
2
(8  6) = 0
from this deviation. Lowering just the second bid results in sometimes winning a rst
object at a loss, and never winning a second object. Lowering both bids results in payo
0. The problem here is that the player would eectively like to raise his second bid and
lower his rst, which is infeasible.
3.5 Strategies and Equilibrium
Given the denitions from the previous subsections, an auction is a specication of
(P; o; t; b
0
). That is, an auction consists of a probability measure, a tie-breaking rule,
a payment rule, and a reserve price vector. In what follows, in some cases it will be clear
that these are given and we omit mention of them.
We now turn to formal denitions of the game induced by the auction in terms of
strategies and equilibrium.
We write i's expected utility given a (possibly omniscient) tie-breaking rule o, payment
rule t, bid prole b, valuation vector v, and endowment prole e as
u
i
(o; t; b; e; v) =
`
X
a
i
=0
o(e; v; b)[a
i
]U
i
0
@
0
@
X
ha
i
v
ih
1
A
  t
i
(a
i
; e; b)
1
A
: (1)
Strategies
A (distributional) strategy for player i is a (Borel) probability measure m
i
on B
i

i
that has a marginal distribution of P
i
on 
i
.
See Milgrom and Weber [24] for discussion of distributional strategies.
Given a prole of distributional strategies m
1
; : : : ; m
n
, player i's expected payo can
be written as:

i
(m;P; o; t; b
0
) =
Z
u
i
(o; t; b; e; v)dm
1
(b
1
je
1
; v
1
) : : : dm
n
(b
n
je
n
; v
n
)dP (e; v):
When some of the arguments are xed, we omit them from the notation, and for instance
write (m; o) when all but the tie-breaking rule is xed.
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Equilibrium
A prole of distributional strategiesm
1
; : : : ; m
n
is an equilibrium for auction (P; o; t; b
0
)
if

i
(m;P; o; t; b
0
)  
i
(m
 i
;
c
m
i
; P; o; t; b
0
)
for all i and strategies
c
m
i
.
Weak Dominance
As we wish to prove existence of equilibria that satisfy a renement that will rule out
some trivial equilibria, we establish that players use strategies in the closure of the set
of undominated strategies. The formal denitions are as follows.
Say that bid vector b
i
is weakly dominated at e
i
; v
i
by b
0
i
if
u
i
(o; t; b
 i
; b
0
i
; e; v)  u
i
(o; t; b
 i
; b
i
; e; v);
for any e
 i
; v
 i
; b
 i
, with strict inequality at least one such prole, where o is standard
tie-breaking. We say that b
i
is undominated at e
i
; v
i
if it is not weakly dominated by any
other bid.
Note that we include the bid of player 0 in this denition, which is not completely
standard, as, at the time that a player submits his bid, he already knows b
0
: This provides
for a stronger result and actually simplies the proofs.
It is worth discussing why our denition of weak dominance is relative to standard tie-
breaking. With non-standard tie-breaking, some pretty odd behaviors are undominated,
especially in the multiple unit demand case. Consider an example where two players
each value two units. The auction rule is that all objects are sold at the lowest winning
bid. Most of the time, 2 objects are available. Occasionally, there is only 1. Finally,
player 2 always submits two bids of 3. The tie breaking rule, for whatever reason, is
that if there is a tie at 3, and player 1's rst bid is 6, then both objects go to player 1.
If player 1's rst bid is anything else, the second object is allocated at random. Then,
when player 2 has value vector (5; 4); it is undominated for him to bid (6; 3); even though
his rst bid is higher than his rst value. Under standard tie breaking, of course, one's
rst bid is irrelevant to the probability that one's second bid is lled if one is involved
in a tie, and such a bid vector is indeed weakly dominated. Although this example is
clearly articial, either explicitly or implicitly, either approach to existence, via either
JSSZ or Reny, requires us to admit this type of thing as a possibility. Thus to really have
the appropriate bite on weakly dominated strategies, we rule them out under standard
tie-breaking rules.
It is well-known that existence of equilibrium in games with continuous action spaces
may require the use of weakly dominated actions. An example is equilibrium in a
21
Bertrand game with symmetric constant marginal costs. As such a game has analogs
in the auction setting, we cannot meaningfully require that a distributional strategy puts
weight zero on weakly dominated bids. It is, however, coherent to require that the dis-
tributional strategy put probability 1 on the closure of the set of non-weakly dominated
bids.
To formalize this, let W
0
i
 
i
B
i
be the set of e
i
; v
i
; b
i
such that b
i
is undominated
for i given e
i
; v
i
: Let W
i
be the closure of W
0
i
.
Assumption 10: (Undominated Strategies). For each player i 2 N; there is a measur-
able map !
i
: 
i
 B
i
! 
i
 B
i
such that for each (e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) ; !
i
(e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) = (e
i
; v
i
; b
0
i
)
where b
0
i
= b
i
if (e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) 2 W
i
; and b
0
i
weakly dominates b
i
given (e
i
; v
i
) if (e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) =2 W
i
.
A10 states that one can, in a measurable way, identify bids so that whenever (e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) =2
W
i
then b
i
is replaced by a bid that weakly dominates it and results in an element of W
i
:
Of course, for this to be satised, one needs to know that W
i
is in fact non-empty
relative to each (e
i
; v
i
): For general games with continuum action spaces, this need not
be so. Consider a game with action space [0; 1]; and payos equal to action for all actions
less than 1, but equal to -1 for action 1. Then, all actions are weakly (in fact strictly)
dominated. The question in the auction setting is whether similar things might arise,
especially once one considers what happens to payos at ties (where it is easy to construct
bid vectors relative to which there is no best response).
We have not found a sensible auction-like example where A10 fails. For example, in
a rst price auction (or a discriminatory multiple unit auction), any bid less than value
is undominated: any higher bid may simply result in bidding more in situations where
one might already have won, while any lower bid may result in the loss of a protable
purchase. W thus includes all bids in which one bids at or below value. Similarly, in
a second price auction, a bid equal to value is not weakly dominated. And, in either
case, replacing buy bids above value (or sell bids below value) by bids at value is clearly
measurable.
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In an all pay auction, a bid of zero is not weakly dominated, and replacing
bids above value by 0 is again clearly measurable. Using these two ideas, it is easy to
check that A10 is satised for all the auctions discussed in Section 3.3.
A useful observation is the following:
Lemma 5 Under A1-A10, given (e
i
; v
i
); let b
i
be any bid vector such that p
ihe
i
(b
ih
) < v
ih
for some h  e
i
, or p
ihe
i
(b
ih
) > v
ih
for some h > e
i
. Then (e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) =2 W
i
.
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In an unfair rst price auction in which player 1 pays, say, 2/3 of his bid, one would replace bids
above 3v
i
=2 by bids of 3v
i
=2:
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That such a bid vector is weakly dominated at (e
i
; v
i
); so that (e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) =2 W
0
i
can be
seen as follows. If one raises a sell bid where p
ihe
i
(b
ih
) < v
ih
; then the only change can
be to either sell one less object, which originally sold at a loss, or to raise the market
price as a seller, either of which benets the player. By A7, there can be no change if one
was a net buyer before the change in bid. A similar argument applies when one lowers
a buy bid where p
ihe
i
(b
ih
) > v
ih
: Note that the same argument will be true for nearby
(e
0
i
; v
0
i
; b
0
i
) : Hence, a neighborhood of (e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) is outside of W
0
i
; and so (e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) =2 W
i
:
A slightly more detailed proof appears in the appendix.
We say that a prole of distributional strategies m is undominated

if each m
i
places
probability one on W
i
.
4 Invariance and Existence
We now state our rst main result.
Theorem 6 If an auction (P; o; t; b
0
) satises A1-A10 and o is trade-maximizing, then
it has at least one undominated

equilibrium. Moreover, if m is such an equilibrium, then
the probability of competitive ties under m is 0; and m remains an equilibrium under
any omniscient and eectively trade-maximizing tie-breaking rule, including standard tie-
breaking.
Our route for the proof of Theorem 6 is as follows. We begin with invariance: we
show that any undominated

equilibrium must have zero probability of any player being
involved in a competitive tie and would also be an equilibrium if we changed the method
of tie-breaking to any other eectively trade-maximizing omniscient tie-breaking rule.
Using invariance, if we can establish existence of an equilibrium in non-weakly dominated
strategies for some omniscient tie-breaking rule, this implies existence of (the same)
equilibrium under any tie-breaking rule, omniscient or standard. This second step is
fairly easily established via either of two results, either JSSZ, or Reny.
The discussion of invariance appears in the next subsection (4.1). The step from
invariance to existence is in subsection (4.2), with additional details in the appendix.
Those not interested in the proof can proceed directly to Section 5 to nd results estab-
lishing the existence of equilibria with a positive probability of trade, an important issue
in auctions such as double-auctions.
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4.1 Invariance
The fact that ties are the critical worry for establishing existence of equilibrium follows
from the fact that ties are the only potential points of discontinuity. So, intuitively, if
we establish that players prefer to avoid ties, then we show that the discontinuities are
not important, which in turn allows us to establish the existence of equilibrium. Let us
go right to the heart of the matter.
Lemma 7 Consider any auction (P; o; t; b
0
) satisfying A1-A10 and any prole of strate-
gies m. For each " > 0 and any bidder i 2 N there exists m
0
i
within " of m
i
29
such that
m
 i
; m
0
i
is tie-free for i
30
and 
i
(m
 i
; m
0
i
)  
i
(m
 i
; m
i
)  ".
Lemma 7 shows that for any prole of strategies, any player can nd a close-by
strategy that does not involve any ties and does nearly as well as her original strategy.
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Note that the Lemma 7 does not put any requirements on o or on m, and so it
allows for tie-breaking that is not trade-maximizing and for strategies that are in weakly
dominated strategies.
Lemma 8 Fix an auction (P; o; t; b
0
) satisfying A1-A10. Let m be undominated

, and
either have a positive probability of ties where o is not trade-maximizing or a positive
probability of competitive ties. Then, there exists some bidder i 2 N and a strategy m
0
i
such that m
 i
; m
0
i
is tie-free for i and

i
(m
 i
; m
0
i
; P; o; t; b
0
) > 
i
(m;P; o; t; b
0
):
Lemma 8 shows that for any prole of strategies placing probability one on the closure
of the set of undominated strategies, but involving a positive probability of competitive
ties or non-competitive ones that are not trade-maximizing, some player has an improving
deviation. This implies that if there exists an undominated

equilibrium, then it must
not involve any such ties.
The proofs of Lemmas 7 and 8 appear in the appendix. The idea behind Lemma 7
is fairly straightforward. Essentially, one bumps bids b
ih
for which v
ih
> p
ihe
i
(b
ih
) up
slightly and bids for which v
ih
 p
ihe
i
(b) down slightly in such a way as to avoid bids
made by other players with positive probability. Any change in trade this brings about is
at most slightly unprotable. For example, if a buy bid is bumped up, and wins an extra
object, then the payment for the object is approximately p
ihe
i
(b
ih
): Since the change in
29
Use the topology of weak convergence.
30
That is, m
 i
;m
0
i
leads to a probability 0 of i being involved in a tie.
31
It is important to remark that this is not the same as establishing better-reply-security as dened
by Reny [27]. Better-reply-security does not hold here, as we discuss in more detail below. We are
not considering all payos that may be reached in the closure of the graph of the game; only ones that
directly correspond to the strategies in question.
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bids is small, the prot of the player when his allocation does not change is also little
aected. The detailed proof is slightly more involved, because (a) it has to be checked
that one can always perform this perturbation consistently across dierent h, (b) one
needs to perform this perturbation in a measurable fashion across bids and types so that
the composition of the original distributional strategy and the perturbation remains a
valid distributional strategy, and (c) the possibility that odd tie breaking might result in
a small change in a non-marginal bid aecting whether or not a marginal bid wins must
be taken account of.
To see Lemma 8, assume that there is a positive probability of a competitive tie or a
non-competitive but non-trade maximizing tie at b

Since m is undominated

, by Lemma
5, a player will not submit a buy bid b
ih
= b

where v
ih
< p
ihe
i
(b
ih
) or a sell bid where
v
ih
> p
ihe
i
(b
ih
): Since the distribution of values is atomless, there is zero probability that
v
ih
= p
ihe
i
(b

): Hence, almost all the buyers at that tie would strictly prefer to buy, and
almost all sellers would prefer to sell. But, no matter what the omniscient tie-breaking
rule, if there is a positive probability of a competitive tie or a non-competitive and non-
trade-maximizing tie at some b

, then at least one player who would benet from trade
is sometimes \losing" the tie, and so strictly benet by the deviation described above.
When we put Lemmas 7 and 8 together, we end up with the following implication.
Theorem 9 (Invariance) If an auction (P; o; t; b
0
) satises A1-A10, and an undominated

prole of distributional strategies m is an equilibrium, then under m there is zero prob-
ability of a competitive tie or non-competitive ties where o is not trade-maximizing, and
m remains an equilibrium for (P; o
0
; t; b
0
) for any trade-maximizing tie-breaking rule o
0
.
Note that the conclusion that we can switch from o to o
0
and still have m be an
equilibrium, is not a direct implication of Lemma 8. It may be that m is a equilibrium
under o, but o
0
would induce some player to deviate to establish a new tie. This possibility
is ruled out using Lemma 7, as the following short proof shows.
Proof of Theorem 9: The fact that m must be free of competitive ties and non-
competitive ties where o is not trade-maximizing follows directly from Lemma 8. Let us
argue that m is also an equilibrium for (P; o
0
; t; b
0
). Given that any ties occurring with
positive probability under m must be non-competitive and where o is trade-maximizing,
m must lead to the same payo vector u under both o and o
0
. Now, suppose to the
contrary of the theorem that m is not an equilibrium under o
0
. Then there exists i and
m
0
i
such that 
i
(m
 i
; m
0
i
; P; o
0
; t; b
0
) > u
i
. By Lemma 7 we can nd m
00
i
which is tie-free
for i and such that 
i
(m
 i
; m
00
i
; P; o
0
; t; b
0
) > u
i
. Since m
 i
; m
00
i
is tie-free for i it follows
that 
i
(m
 i
; m
00
i
; P; o; t; b
0
) = 
i
(m
 i
; m
00
i
; P; o
0
; t; b
0
) > u
i
, contradicting the fact that m
is an equilibrium at o.
The conclusions of Theorem 9 can fail if one ventures beyond private values. This
can be seen in Example 1 of JSSZ, where there exists an equilibrium for a non-standard
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tie-breaking rule, but none exists for standard tie-breaking.
Theorem 9 establishes that any undominated

equilibrium can only involve trade-
maximizing non-competitive ties, and will remain an equilibrium for any trade-maximizing
tie-breaking rule. Thus, to prove Theorem 6 we need only prove that there exists an
undominated

equilibrium for some tie-breaking rule.
We think that it is instructive to oer proofs via both JSSZ and Reny, as at this point
they are both fairly straightforward. Moreover, this claries the relationship between
these two methodologies, which may be useful in further applications and in understand-
ing existence issues more broadly.
4.2 Two Proofs of Theorem 3
We rst construct an auxiliary game where dominated strategies are penalized according
to their distance from the set of undominated strategies. Equilibria in this game must
involve undominated strategies. It is also easy to see that these remain equilibria when
the penalty of domination is removed (being careful with some details regarding the
tie-breaking rule). This is stated in the following Lemma.
Consider the game G(P; o; t; b
0
) in which when any player i uses b
i
with type e
i
; v
i
; he
pays a penalty c
i
(e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) in additional to the payo he receives from (P; o; t; b
0
), where
c
i
is the distance of a point from the set W
i
.
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Lemma 10 Consider an auction (P; o; t; b
0
) and the auxiliary G(P; o; t; b
0
) that penal-
izes weakly dominated strategies. Let m be an equilibrium of G(P; o; t; b
0
). Then, m is
undominated

and is an equilibrium of the original auction (P; o; t; b
0
).
If G(P; o; t; b
0
) has an equilibrium m for some o, then by Lemma 10, so does the
original auction. Then by Theorem 9, m remains an equilibrium for any other trade-
maximizing o. This would then complete the proof of Theorem 6.
Proving Theorem 6 using JSSZ's Endogenous Tie-Breaking Rules.
Theorem 1 in JSSZ implies that there exists an equilibrium m in an augmented form
of G(P; o; t; b
0
) where players also (truthfully) announce their types and tie-breaking
depends on those announcements. Those strategies remain an equilibrium when we
ignore type announcements, and change the tie-breaking rule to directly depend on types
32
Take the distance of a point from the (closed) set W
i
to be the minimum of the distances from that
point to points in the set.
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rather than announced types. Thus, there exists an equilibrium of G(P; o; t; b
0
) and hence
the original auction for some omniscient tie-breaking rule o; and we are done.
The only detail to check is that G(P; o; t; b
0
) falls into the class of games identied by
JSSZ. This follows from checking two things. First, it is clear that the correspondence
taking bid vectors into distributions over consistent allocations (outcomes in JSSZ) is
upper hemi-continuous, non-empty and convex-valued. Second, JSSZ write payos as an
inner product of a nite set of functions u
k
which are continuous in actions and types,
and an outcome function which depends on actions and leads to probabilities over the
u
k
's. Here, the u
k
's are simply the utilities that a player gets conditional on getting a
xed number of objects, and the outcome function is the tie-breaking rule (see Equation
1). These are continuous, given the continuity both of the payment rules t; and of the
penalty to weakly dominated strategies.
Proving Theorem 6 using Reny's better-reply-security.
Again, we consider G(P; o; t; b
0
). In fact, here the penalties are necessary not only for
establishing existence of an equilibrium in non-weakly dominated strategies, but because
the game without these penalties can fail to satisfy the conditions of Reny. We return to
illustrate this with an example below.
The following denitions and conditions from Reny are the critical ones.
A player i can secure a payo of  at m
 i
if there is a strategy m
i
such that

i
(m
0
 i
; m
i
)   for all m
 i
in some neighborhood of m
 i
.
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A game is better reply secure if for any m

; u

in the closure of the graph of the vector
payo function, if m

is not an equilibrium, then there exists i who can secure a payo
strictly above u

i
at m

 i
.
It follows from Theorem 3.1 in Reny [27] that if G(P; o; t; b
0
) is better reply secure,
then G(P; o; t; b
0
) has an equilibrium, and we will have once again concluded the proof
of Theorem 6.
34
So, it remains to verify that the (penalized) auction satises better-reply-security. It
is tempting to read-better-reply security as saying \whenever a player has a better reply,
he has a secure better reply" and downplay the importance of taking the closure of the
graph of the payo function of the game rather than just considering the graph itself.
The following example shows the key role played by the closure operation.
33
Again, use the topology of weak convergence of measures on the distributional strategies (which
leads to a compact set of strategies).
34
Reny's Theorem 3.1 requires a quasi-concavity of payos and a compactness of strategies. Com-
pactness has already been established. Even though the U
i
's we have considered here are not necessarily
quasi-concave, note that payos are in fact linear in m, as these are distributional strategies and prefer-
ences are von Neumann-Morgenstern.
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Example 11 Consider a rst price auction (with standard tie-breaking) with 2 players
and one object for sale. Player 1's value is always 1 and player 2's value is always 2. This
game violates better-reply-security. In particular, consider m

; u

where both players bid
1 and u

= (0; 1) (because player 2 always wins the object). This is the limit, for instance,
of a sequence of bids where player 1 always bids 1 and 2's bids approach 1 from above.
35
It is easy to see that m

is not an equilibrium of the auction and yet neither player can
secure (or even obtain) a payo above u

via a deviation. Hence better-reply-security
fails. If one just considers m; u's in the graph of the game, then it is easy to check that for
any better reply there exists a secure better reply. So, the failure of better-reply-security
comes at a point in the closure of the graph of the game, but not in the graph of the
game.
Fascinatingly, despite the fact that this game fails better-reply-security, not only does
it have Nash equilibria, but m

; u

is in fact the limit of such equilibria! Let player 1
randomize uniformly over a small interval (1 "; 1); and player 2 always bid 1.
36
Player 1
does not want to bid more, since the object is only worth 1 to him. And, for small enough
"; player 2 does not want to bid anything less than 1. As "! 0; the limit distributional
strategies and payos are m

; u

: This provides a sharp example that shows that better-
reply-security is suÆcient but not necessary for existence.
It is also useful to point out that if one breaks all ties in favor of player 2, then m

; u

is Nash. This illustrates that our invariance result (Theorem 9) can fail when there are
atoms in the distribution of types.
The example makes it clear that to verify better-reply-security we need to have some
handle on the possible m

; u

that are in the closure of the graph of the auction in
question. Generally, doing this directly will be complicated. For instance, consider a
bid vector with three tied players 1,2,3; one could approach this vector from a sequence
that has player 3 always winning, or with 1 and 2 tied and always winning, or any of a
continuum of other possibilities. Once we are in auctions with many objects and allow for
the mixing possible under distributional strategies, the potential limit points are quite
complex.
37
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It is useful to point out that endogenous tie-breaking would actually prescribe the tie-breaking rule
which gives the object to player 2 at a tied bid of 1, and would lead to an equilibrium under this
alternative tie-breaking rule.
36
This type of equilibrium was identied in the context of asymmetric Bertrand games by Blume [3].
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Recall from the introduction that another way to apply Reny's result is via reciprocal upper semicon-
tinuity, and tie-breaking that maximizes the sum of the player surpluses. Under this technique, one can
a priori restrict agents to the closure of the non-weakly dominated strategies, side-stepping the penalty
functions we use. Reciprocal upper semicontinuity is intuitively obvious, since any ties that exist along a
sequence of bids proles also exist in the limit, and hence the auctioneer has at least as much discretion
in the limit as he did late in the sequence. Because we are working in the space of distributional strate-
gies, this pointwise argument needs to be applied with some care. One also has to be careful about the
dierence between eÆcient tie-breaking and that which maximizes the sum of payos to players other
than 0. Reciprocal upper semicontinuity can fail under eÆcient tie-breaking (for instance, it is easy to
generate examples where along a sequence, allocations are ineÆcient, but result in low payments to the
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The key to verifying better-reply-security comes back to the use of omniscient tie-
breaking rules! This is captured in the following lemma.
Lemma 12 Consider an auction (P; o; t; b
0
). For each m

; u

in the closure of the graph
G(P; o; t; b
0
), there exists an omniscient tie-breaking rule o

such that u

is the payo
vector induced under G(P; o

; t; b
0
) by m

.
Proof of Lemma 12: Consider a sequence (m
k
; u
k
) in the graph the graph G(P; o; t; b
0
)
converging to m

; u

. Then each m
k
along with o induces a measure M
k
on  B  A,
which leads to the utilities u
k
. Taking a subsequence if necessary, the sequence of M
k
's
converges weakly to a measure M

on   B  A. Given that utility functions are
continuous on B A (A is nite), the corresponding utilities induced under M

are
u

. Note that M

can be induced by an omniscient tie-breaking rule o

coupled with m

(see, for instance, Lemma 2 in Simon and Zame [32]).
Now let us use Lemma 12 to verify better-reply-security to complete the proof of
Theorem 6.
Consider any m

; u

in the closure of the graph of G(P; o; t; b
0
) which is not an equilib-
rium of G(P; o; t; b
0
). By Lemma 12 there exists an omniscient tie-breaking rule o

such
that u

is the payo vector induced under G(P; o

; t; b
0
) by m

. By Lemma 10 we can
deduce that m

is not an equilibrium of G(P; o

; t; b
0
). To see this, suppose otherwise.
Then by Lemma 10 m

is an equilibrium of (P; o

; t; b
0
) and is undominated

. Then by
Theorem 9 it would be an equilibrium of (P; o; t; b
0
) and since m

is undominated

, it
would also be an equilibrium of G(P; o; t; b
0
), which would be a contradiction. Thus there
exists an improving deviation m
i
relative to the game G(P; o

; t; b
0
). By Lemma 7, this
improving deviation m
i
can be taken to be tie-free.
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Then m
i
remains tie-free for all
strategies in a neighborhood of m

 i
, and so player i's payo is continuous in m
 i
in this
neighborhood and the payo is independent of the tie breaking rule. Thus, m
i
secures a
payo above u

i
at m

 i
relative to G(P; o; t; b
0
), as required by better-reply-security.
Finally, let us return to the issue of why penalizing weakly dominated strategies is
important to verifying better-reply-security.
Example 13 Consider a two-player and one-object rst-price auction, with standard
tie-breaking. Player 1 has v
1
uniformly distributed on [0; 1], and player 2 has v
2
uni-
formly distributed on [2; 3]. This auction satises all of our assumptions, and indeed
has an equilibrium. Nevertheless, (P; o

; t; b
0
) fails to satisfy better-reply-security; only
auctioneer, while the limiting eÆcient allocation raises these payments by enough so that players are
worse o in aggregate). We chose the direct application of Reny's better reply security because of the
insight it provides into the relationship between better reply security and endogenous tie-breaking rules.
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To be careful, Lemma 7 would apply to G(P; o

; t; b
0
) rather than (P; o

; t; b
0
). It is a direct extension
that it holds for G(P; o

; t; b
0
) as well.
29
G(P; o

; t; b
0
) satises it. To see this, consider m

; u

such that under m

both players
always bid 1.5 and u

= (0; 1). This is in the closure of the graph, by considering a se-
quence where player 1 always bids 1.5 and player 2 bids 1:5+
1
k
(regardless of valuation).
Relative to u

, neither player has an improving deviation, even though m

is not an
equilibrium of the auction with the usual tie-breaking rule, and so better-reply-security
fails.
4.3 Comments on Endogenous Sharing and better-reply-security.
It is interesting that the tricky part of the proof using better-reply-security is to get a
handle on the u

's in the closure of the game. The fact that they are those generated
by omniscient tie-breaking suggests a deeper connection between the machinery of Reny
and that of JSSZ. That is, a proof of existence via \apply JSSZ and check that some
equilibria correspond to nice tie-breaking" and \check better-reply-security" are closely
related. Because of the requirement that better-reply-security apply relative to all points
in the closure of the graph, rather than just the graph, one has to understand exactly
what might be in that closure; and the points in the closure are precisely the points that
come from omniscient choices at points of discontinuity. On the other hand, in applying
JSSZ, one has to understand the equilibria that might be generated under omniscient
choices at points of discontinuity. In the auction setting, these two tasks are closely
related. How these approaches turn out to be related and which might be more eÆcient
in other settings is an open question.
4.4 A Corollary on Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria.
As mentioned in the introduction, while Theorem 6 establishes existence of equilibrium
in distributional strategies, in some contexts one can use additional structure to argue
for the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria.
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Let us present one such result.
Consider a situation where the distribution over types is independent across players
and players are risk neutral.
In order to establish this result for this general class of auctions, we need to impose
some restrictions on the interaction of a player's bids for dierent objects. We strengthen
(A8) as follows.
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In terms of distributional strategies, a pure strategy is any strategy that puts probability one on the
graph of a function from types to bids, f : ! B, where f = (f
1
; : : : ; f
n
) and f
i
: 
i
! B
i
. A strategy
is monotone if the f is such that higher valuation vectors lead to (weakly) higher bid vectors - holding
the endowment constant. That is, for any i if v
0
ih
> v
ih
for each h, then f
i
(v
0
i
; e
i
)  f(v
i
; e
i
).
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For any (e; b) and i such that i is not involved in any competitive ties (so that i's
allocation is unique), let T
i
(e; b) be the total payment made by i.
Assumption 8
0
: A8 holds. In addition, consider any (e; b) and (e; b
 i
; b
0
i
) such that i
is not involved in any competitive ties, and h such that b
i; h
; b
0
ih
and b
0
i; h
; b
ih
are both
valid bid vectors. Then,
T (e; b
 i
; b
i
)  T (e; b
 i
; b
i; h
; b
0
ih
) = T (e; b
 i
; b
0
i; h
; b
ih
)  T (e; b
 i
; b
0
i
):
(A8
0
) states that, holding the overall endowment and the bids of the other players
constant, the eect of a change in i's h
th
bid on his payments is a function only of
what the change in that h
th
bid is, irrespective of i's other bids as long as this change
is feasible.
40
This condition is satised by all the standard auction formats. In (multi-
unit) discriminatory and all pay auctions a change in i's h
th
bid only aects the payment
attributed to the h
th
h object (in the all-pay auction this is whether or not the object
is won), and so the change in payment is unaected by the level of the rest of i's bid
vector. In a Vickrey auction, the change in i's h
th
bid can only aect whether i gets an
h
th
object, and if it does then the price for that additional object depends on the bids of
the other agents, and is independent of the rest of i's bid vector. In a multi-unit uniform
price auction, an additional feature arises in that the h
th
bid might be setting the price
for i's other objects. However, for any feasible bid vector where i's h
th
bid is setting
the price, i must be getting h   1 objects, and so the change in payments is then also
irrespective of the level of i's other bids subject to this change of h
th
bid being feasible.
This rules out settings where, for example, the price to players other than some player
j in a multiple unit auction is a smoothly changing convex combination of the Vickrey
and highest rejected bid rule, depending on the bid of player j. It also rules out a
multiple unit variant of the 3rd price auction in which the price is set by the second
highest rejected bid. In this setting, knowledge that one's 2nd bid has rank
P
e
i
+2 does
not tie down the eect of a change in bid on payments, since one's highest bid may or
may not be among the rst
P
e
i
:
Corollary 14 Consider any auction satisfying (A1) to (A10) and (A8
0
), where types
are independent across players, the marginal distribution of each player's vector of val-
ues is absolutely continuous with respect to `-dimensional Lebesgue measure, and each
player i  1 is risk-neutral. There exists a monotone pure strategy equilibrium in
undominated

strategies with a zero probability of competitive ties, which is an equilib-
rium under any omniscient and eectively trade-maximizing tie-breaking rule, including
standard tie-breaking.
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Given (A8), a suÆcient condition for (A8
0
) is that
@T
i
(e;b)
@b
ih
be well dened when no other bidder has
a bid equal to b
ih
, and this partial derivative depends only on (h; e), b
ih
and the rank of b
ih
among all
bids.
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The proof of Corollary 14 appears in the appendix. The basic ideas are fairly straight-
forward, although the details are slightly more involved. Under (A8
0
), risk-neutrality, and
independence, a change in a bid for the h
th
object by i can be considered essentially in-
dependently of bids for other objects. So, a change in one bid does not change the eect
on payments of a change in another. And, independence also implies that the change
of a bid aects payments and the probability of winning a given object in a way that
is independent of a player's valuation. Thus, given private values, if raising a bid is
weakly benecial at one valuation, it is strictly benecial at any higher valuation. This
implies monotonicity and pure strategies to the extent that changes in bids matter. To
complete the picture, we use a modication of the auction that is similar to the seeding
argument we use to prove positive trade in the next section, and is also in the spirit of a
technique subsequently used by Kazumori [15] to argue for existence of monotone pure
strategy equilibria. In particular, with a small probability one introduce extra bidders
who randomly bid at all levels for all objects and vary the available supply to take on
any possible value. This implies that any change in bids matters, and then bids must be
monotone and hence pure (almost) everywhere. Taking careful limits as the noise goes
to 0, one can use results of JSSZ and the invariance results (Theorem 9) to deduce a
monotone pure strategy equilibrium of the original auction.
It is also worth noting that even without the perturbation arguments, bids must be
increasing over ranges where they matter. What is possible is that some equilibria might
involve players mixing or bidding non-monotonically over a range of bids all of which,
for example, never win. In the single unit case, one can eectively purify such equilibria.
Doing so in the multiple unit case seems more daunting, and so it is open whether the
auctions described might have other equilibria meaningfully dierent from the monotone
equilibria we have shown to exist.
5 Equilibria with a Positive Probability of Trade
For some auction settings, a major potential weakness in the existence result (Theorem
6) as currently stated is that there may be a zero probability of trade. Consider, for
example, a simple double auction (as in Example 9 above). There is an equilibrium that
puts probability one on the closure of the set of undominated strategies in this auction
where sellers always bid v; and buyers always bid 0: Buyers know that sellers are never
making serious bids and sellers know that buyers are never making serious bids, and thus
their own non-serious bids are best responses, and yet undominated strategies are used.
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So, it could be that Theorem 6 has only \proven" that this degenerate equilibrium exists.
In this section we establish the existence of an equilibrium with a positive probability
of trade, for the auctions in our class.
41
In fact, the equilibrium satises a trembling hand perfection requirement, as discussed in Jackson
and Swinkels [13].
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First, we note that in some cases it is straightforward to see that each equilibrium
identied in Theorem 6 must involve a positive probability of trade. In particular, con-
sider the case where the non-strategic player 0 is active if P
0
(fe
0
> 0g) > 0 and that
when e
0
> 0; player 0 sets a reserve price for at least one of his units so that there is a
positive probability that some buyer has a value for a rst unit that would lead to a pos-
itive utility if they were to be allocated it at a bid of the reserve price (for simple pricing
rules, this reduces simply to a reserve below the highest possible buy value). Then, there
is clearly trade in equilibrium.
So, the issue of establishing existence of equilibria with a positive probability of trade
involves settings where player 0 is not active, as in a double auction. We use three
additional assumptions. The rst two are critical, the third a convenience.
The rst assumption rules out too much dependence in the distribution of values.
Essentially, it requires only that changing one player's type does not alter the support
of possible types for another, and is consistent with any nite likelihood ratio on the
distribution of values within that support. As such, it is quite weak.
Assumption 11: (Full Support Prior) f() > 0 for all  2 , where f is the Radon-
Nikodym derivative of P with respect to
Q
i
P
i
:
Given that f is a continuous function (A3) and  is compact (A2), f() > 0 implies
that there exists 1 > M > M
0
> 0 such that M > f() > M
0
for all  2 : The new
content of A11 over that of A2 and A3, is of course, the existence of M
0
.
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We use A11 to show that the fact that types are not perfectly correlated translates
into the same feature for bids (see Lemma 17 in the appendix).
Our second assumption ensures that there is some possibility of serious competition
for the gains to trade. This guarantees that some players (e.g., buyers) will be forced to
make bids that are attractive enough to induce other players (e.g., sellers) to be active.
Assumption 12: (Competition for Gains from Trade). Let w be the max of the support
of the distribution over all buy values, and w the min of the support of the distribution
over sell values. Let [w; w]  [b;

b] and at least one of the following hold:
(1) For each player who ever has a buy value above w, there is a positive probability
that the remaining players have at least `+ 1 sell values below w, or
(2) For each player who ever has a sell value below w, there is a positive probability
that the remaining players have at least `+ 1 buy values above w.
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It should be noted that the amount of trade guaranteed by the proof of Theorem 15 depends on
M
0
; and that when M
0
is small, so is the amount of trade that is guaranteed to occur. See Cripps and
Swinkels [6] for a demonstration that under mild conditions, as the number of players grows, trade in
any such non-trivial equilibria converges to the Walrasian level.
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For some insight into A12, consider a standard double auction. Then, as long as there
are two or more sellers who sometimes have values below w or two or more buyers who
sometimes have values above w; A12 is satised. Within the standard double auction, we
are ruling out only the case of one buyer and one seller.
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The condition involving `+ 1
extends this to multiple unit demands. It rules out, for example, a setting in which there
is a single buyer demanding 3 units, and two sellers, each with one unit to sell. Here,
there is no real competition among the sellers. This assumption of having competition
is used in our proof of Theorem 15 in showing that seeding trade then leads to positive
amounts of trade, but this condition is clearly not always necessary for getting positive
trade in equilibrium.
When players can be either buyers or sellers a priori, the condition is slightly more
intricate. In particular, consider a case where there are three players. Player 1 always has
endowment 0, and value uniform on [:5; :6]. Player 2 always has endowment 1, and value
uniform on [:4; :5]: Finally, player 3 half the time has endowment 0 and value uniform on
[:9; 1]; and half the time endowment 1 and value uniform on [0; :1]: Then, the condition
fails, because the only time that player 3 has a high buy value, there is only one seller,
and the only time player 3 has a low sell value, there is only one buyer. Hence, there is
really no competition for the gains to trade generated by the existence of player 3.
Finally, in establishing existence, we did not need a direct tie between the level of
bids and the prices paid, other than some continuity and monotonicity conditions. In
order to use a \seeding trade" argument, it is convenient to have a tighter feel for how
payments vary with bids. The following assumption does this.
Assumption 13: (Marginal Transfers Equal Bids) For any i, h, and e; t
i
(h; e; b)  t
i
(h 
1; e; b) = b
ih
:
A13 states that when a player is involved in tie, he pays his bid. This is true for any
sensible double auction rule, as when there is a tie at b

; then b

is the only price which
clears the market for the submitted demand and supply curves.
We can now state our second main result.
Theorem 15 Each auction (P; o; t; b
0
) satisfying A1-A13 has an undominated

equilib-
rium that has a positive probability of trade.
Given Theorem 15, and recalling our discussion of auctions in which player 0 is active,
we obtain the following corollary.
43
See Kadan [14] for a proof of existence in the bilateral case.
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Corollary 16 Let (P; o; t; b
0
) satisfy A1-A10. If either player 0 is active
44
(as in a one
sided auction), or A11-A13 are satised, then there exists an undominated

equilibrium
that has a positive probability of trade.
The idea of the proof of Theorem 15 can be seen in a simplied setting. Think about
the case of two buyers each desiring one object, and two sellers each with one object to
sell, where the marginal of P onto each player's value has support [w;w]; and where values
are not too dependent, so that A11 is satised. Since buyers and sellers are distinct, A12
is also satised.
We \seed" trade in the following manner. Consider a sequence of modied auctions
indexed by x, in which we add a 5th player who 1=x of the time has e
5
= 1 and makes
a sell oer which is uniform on [w;w]; 1=x of the time has e
5
= 0 and makes a buy oer
which is uniform on [w;w], and the remainder of the time has e
5
= 0 and makes no bids,
where all of this is independent of (e; v). Clearly, any equilibrium in auction x must have
some trade, as otherwise someone should behave in a way to trade with player 5 when
he is active.
Now let us argue that trade is in fact bounded away from zero as x!1: Suppose to
the contrary that as x!1; the amount of trade heads to zero. The only way this can
happen is that the probability that buyers oer above w vanishes as does the probability
that sellers ask less than w: To see this, assume for example, that there is probability 
of a sell bid below w   : Then this sell bid must go unlled with a probability going
to one as otherwise there would be a non-degenerate amount of trade. So, consider the
strategy for buyers where they bid w  whenever they have a value of at least w =2.
Under A11 this would win with a probability bounded away from 0. Hence, there is a
strategy available to buyers that earns an amount bounded away from zero. But then,
equilibrium prots must also be bounded away from zero, which is inconsistent with the
expected amount of trade going to zero.
So, we have argued that in order for trade to vanish, it must be that with probability
approaching one both sellers are asking almost w; and both buyers are oering nearly
w: However, this cannot be part of an equilibrium by the following argument. Because
of A12, there is a positive probability that simultaneously, both sellers (or both buyers)
would be willing to buy the object at the value of one of the buyers. So, think about
deviating to a slightly lower bid as a seller. If there was no high buy bid, this is costless.
So, we can condition payos on the event that there is at least one high buy bid, whether
by player 5 or by one of the buyers. Because of player 5; this is a positive probability
event. But, for each of player 5 and the two buyers, the probability of a high buy bid is
very small. So, since values (and hence bids) are somewhat independent, conditional on
there being any high buy bid, there is almost surely only one high buy bid. But then,
since there is a positive probability of both sellers simultaneously being interested, they
44
This requires that player 0 set a reserve price for selling at least one of the objects below w (or above
w in a procurement auction).
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will have an incentive to compete against each other to be the one who trades in this
event. This rules out that sell bids are very high almost always, giving a contradiction.
Essentially then, the presence of the extra player pushes the equilibrium away from
the pure no-trade one. But, once there is some trade, A12 implies that there will be
competition by sellers (or buyers) to be the one who trades in the rare event that it
occurs. This competition pushes bids away from the boundary in a way that implies a
minimum positive level of trade which is independent of x. In the limit, as x!1 this
generates a positive trade equilibrium of the original game.
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6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 5
Assume b is such that p
ihe
i
(b
ih
) < v
ih
for some h  e
i
: Let h
0
be the lowest index
for which this is true. Now, by denition, b
i;h
0
 1
 b
i;h
0
: And, since p
i;h
0
 1;e
i
(b
i;h
0
 1
) 
v
i;h
0
 1
 v
i;h
0
> p
i;h
0
;e
i
(b
i;h
0
); it follows that b
i;h
0
 1
> b
i;h
(recall from A9 that p
i;h
0
 1;e
i
(x) 
p
i;h
0
;e
i
(x); so it cannot be the case that b
i;h
0
 1
= b
i;h
): Raise b
ih
0
by " > 0; where " <
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bi;h
0
 1
  b
i;h
0
; and where v
i;h
0
> p
i;h
0
;e
i
(b
0
ih
0
) for all b
0
ih
0
2 [b
ih
0
; b
ih
0
+ "]: Since p
i;h
0
;e
i
(:) is
continuous (by the continuity of the t
i
's), such an " exists.
Now, for any given b
 i
; e
 i
; let b

be the
P
e
i
  h
0
highest bid submitted by players
other than i: Consider raising i's h
0th
bid continuously from b
ih
0
to b
ih
0
+ ": As long as the
allocation is unchanging (i.e., except at b

; if b

should happen to be in [b
ih
0
; b
ih
0
+ "]),
this is irrelevant if i is currently a net buyer (is receiving e
i
or more objects, and either
irrelevant or helpful if i is currently a net seller (receiving strictly less than e
i
objects), in
each case using A7. So, consider what happens as goes from just below b

to b

, or from
b

to just above b

: In each case, either the allocation is unchanged (if tie-breaking at b

happens to be fortuitous), or i's allocation goes up by one unit (that is, he sells one less
object). But, v
i;h
0
> p
i;h
0
;e
i
(b

) by choice of ": Hence, such a change will strictly improve
i's payo. And, for b

2 (b
ih
0
; b
ih
0
+ ") such a change in allocation must occur. It follows
that the original bid vector b is weakly dominated by b
0
dened in this way.
But, notice that if one chooses any (e
0
i
; v
0
i
; b
0
i
) suÆciently close to (e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) ; it will
remain the case that p
ihe
0
i
(b
0
ih
) < v
0
ih
and so (e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) =2 W
0
i
(note that e
0
i
must equal e
i
for close by (e
0
i
; v
0
i
; b
0
i
)). Hence, there is a ball around (e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) with empty intersection
with W
0
i
; and (e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) =2 W
i
. The proof for h > e
i
is the same.
The following Lemmas are useful in the proofs of Lemmas 7 and 8 and Theorem 15.
Fix a prole of strategies (m
0
1
; : : : ; m
0
n
) (equilibrium or otherwise). Given these strate-
gies, let B be the induced measure over B . Let B
i
be the marginal of B on B
i

i
for i 2 N and let B
0
be simply P
0
, the marginal onto e
0
.
Our next lemma shows that an implication of the absolute continuity of P with
respect to
Q
n
i=0
P
i
(A3) is that B is absolutely continuous with respect to
Q
n
i=0
B
i
: So,
events involving the set of submitted bids and realized values that are zero probability
assuming players draw values and bid independently are also zero probability under the
actual distribution over realized values and submitted bids. If in addition,
Q
n
i=0
P
i
is
absolutely continuous with respect to P (A11) then the reverse implication will be true
as well, so that positive probability events under
Q
n
i=0
B
i
are positive probability under
B.
Lemma 17
(1) Under A2-A4, for each strategy prole m
0
, B is absolutely continuous with respect
to
Q
n
i=0
B
i
:
(2) If A11 is also satised, then
Q
n
i=0
B
i
is absolutely continuous with respect to B
i
:
Proof of Lemma 17. In what follows, think of player 0 as having a singleton strategy
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space (xed at b
0
), so that dm
0
(b
0
; 
0
) = dP
0
(
0
). Consider any Borel E  B  
B(E) =
Z
E
"
n
Y
i=0
dm
i
(b
i
j
i
)
#
dP ()
=
Z
E
f()
"
n
Y
i=0
dm
i
(b
i
j
i
)dP
i
(
i
)
#
=
Z
E
f()
n
Y
i=0
dm
i
(b
i
; 
i
)
=
Z
E
f()dm:
Given that f() < M (A2 and A3), it follows that B(E) < Mm(E). Since m
i
= B
i
,
45
we have established B(E) < M
Q
i
B
i
(E) and hence Part (1). Assume further that 0 <
M
0
< f() (under A11) so that B(E) > M
0
m(E). This implies that B(E) > M
0
Q
i
B
i
(E)
establishing Part (2).
A useful implication of Lemma 17 is that information about the bids or values of
some of the players only changes the probabilities of events involving other players by a
factor of between M and M
0
:
Lemma 18 Under A2-A4 and A11, if J and J
0
are disjoint subsets of players, and E
J
is
a positive probability event involving only the bids or values of players in J; and similarly
for E
J
0
, then
M Pr(E
J
)  Pr(E
J
jE
J
0
) M
0
Pr(E
J
):
Proof of Lemma 18. To see the second inequality (the rst is analogous), note that
Pr(E
J
jE
J
0
) =
Pr(E
J
\ E
J
0
)
Pr(E
J
0
)
 M
0
Pr(E
J
) Pr(E
J
0
)
Pr(E
J
0
)
= M
0
Pr(E
J
);
where the inequality follows from the proof of Lemma 17.
Say that b 2 [b;

b]; is a bid-atom for B
i
if B
i
(fb
ih
= b for some hg) > 0. For each i;
let
b
B
i
be the set of bid-atoms of B
i
:
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B is dened by dB(b; ) =
Q
i
dm
i
(b
i
j
i
)dP (). The careful reader can verify that the marginal of
B on i, B
i
, has the same form as one would arrive at by directly taking the marginal of P onto P
i
which
leads to dm
i
(b
i
j
i
)dP
i
(
i
) (which for a distributional strategy is the same as dm
i
(b
i
; 
i
)).
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Recall that our denition of a tie was constructed to rule out irrelevant cases in which
a small change in bid does not aect the allocation. Say that b
ih
and b
jh
0
are in a pre-tie
if b
ih
= b
jh
0
: Let Y
i

S
j 6=i

b
B
j

: By avoiding b
i
2 Y
i
; i avoids pre-ties with any given
j 6= i, and so the probability that he is involved in a pre-tie (and hence a tie) is 0. This
is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 19 Under A2 to A4, Pr (fb
ih
= b
jh
0
g \ fb
ih
=2 Y
i
g) = 0: That is, there is zero
probability of a pre-tie involving i when i does not use bids in Y
i
:
Proof of Lemma 19 This is obvious if the B
i
are independent. The result follows by
absolute continuity of B with respect to
Q
n
i=1
B
i
(Lemma 17 part (1)).
Proof of Lemma 7:
Choose a sequence X = fx
1
; x
2
; : : :g which is dense on [b;

b]; but which avoids Y
i
. Since
Y
i
is countable, this can be done. For any " > 0; dene the mapping  
"
i
: 
i
B
i
! 
i
B
i
as follows.
If v
ih
> p
ihe
i
(b
ih
), let  
"
i
(e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) = (e
i
; v
i
; b
0
i
) where b
0
ih
is the lowest indexed element
of X such that b
ih
 b
0
ih
 b
ih
+"; and such that b
0
ih
is below the next discretely higher bid
than b
ih
.
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If v
ih
 p
ihe
i
(b
ih
), let  
"
i
(e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) = (e
i
; v
i
; b
0
i
) where b
0
ih
is the lowest indexed
element of X such that b
ih
 b
0
ih
 b
ih
  "; and such that b
0
ih
is above the next discretely
lower bid than b
ih
. Since X is dense, such elements exist (and by Zorn's lemma b
0
ih
is
unique).
So,  
"
i
slightly raises bids where value is above the marginal transfer, and slightly
lowers bids where value is at or below the marginal transfer in such a way as to miss
elements of Y
i
:
Note that the resulting bid vector is still an element of B
i
: To see this, note that for
any h
0
> h; if b
ih
> b
ih
0
then by construction, b
ih
> b
0
ih
: If b
ih
= b
ih
0
; then, since p
ihe
i
(x)
is non-decreasing in h; and since v
ih
is non-increasing, it cannot simultaneously be the
case that v
ih
 p
ihe
i
(b
ih
) and v
ih
0
> p
ih
0
e
i
(b
ih
0
): Hence, the algorithm will never specify
lowering b
ih
but raising b
ih
0
: And, if it species the same direction of movement, it will
also specify the same outcome, so that again there will be no non-monotonicity of the
resultant bid vector.
Next, let us check that  
"
i
is measurable. To see this, x i and h, and for each
j 2 f1; 2; 3; : : :g; let R
j
be the set of (e
i
; v
i
; b) such that either v
ih
> p
ihe
i
(b
ih
), b
ih

x
j
 b
ih
+ "; and x
j
is below the next discretely dierent bid than b
ih
or v
ih
 p
ihe
i
(b
ih
),
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It is useful to note here that raising a buy bid indicates a greater desire to buy, while raising a sell
bid indicates a lower willingness to sell. In each case, since v
ih
> p
ihe
i
(b
ihe
i
); this is the direction of the
player's incentives if he is on the margin between being allocated or not allocated an object h:
41
bih
 x
j
 b
ih
  "; and x
j
is above the next discretely dierent bid than b
ih
. R
j
is the
nite union of the nite intersection of measurable sets, and so is measurable.
But, in fact,  
 1
(x
j
) = R
j
n [
j
0
<j
R
j
; and so is itself measurable. As X is countable,
and as the image of  is contained in X; the result follows.
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Hence, m
i
Æ 
"
i
is a well dened distributional strategy. By construction, under m
i
Æ 
"
i
;
player i is involved in pre-ties with probability zero, and m
i
Æ 
"
i
can be made arbitrarily
close to m
i
.
The proof is completed by noting that when m
i
Æ  
"
i
buys or sells additional objects
compared tom
i
; it does so at prices which are at worst a little unfavorable. More formally,
consider any (e
i
; v
i
; b
i
; e
 i
; b
 i
) and the b
0
generated by  
"
i
: Let a
i
be the allocation i
received with b (given whatever randomizations the auctioneer performed), and a
0
i
be the
allocation under b
0
: Note that with probability one, (e
i
; v
i
; b
0
i
; e
 i
; b
 i
) is such that i is
not involved in any ties given b
0
; so here randomizations are irrelevant. Now, if a
0
= a;
then i's payos have changed by at most z"; where z is the maximum slope of t
i
for
any given endowment and allocation. Assume a
0
> a: Then, for each h 2 (a+ 1; : : : a
0
) ;
it must be that v
i
> p
ihe
i
(b
ih
): This is actually not completely obvious, as one way in
which the player might have picked up an extra object is that one of his other bids was
relevant to whatever odd tie-breaking rule the auctioneer might have been using. But, in
the event that v
i
 p
ihe
i
(b
ih
); b
0
ih
is strictly lower than b
ih
: So, since i was not allocated
an object h before (implying that b
ih
was at best in a tie), then he would certainly will
not be allocated an object h now. Note next that it must have been the case that each
b
ih
, h 2 (a + 1; : : : a
0
) was within " of being involved in a tie (since it was consistent not
to allocate these objects to i before, but it is consistent now). Hence, the increase in i's
payment, given moving from allocation a to a
0
is at most
X
h2(a+1;:::a
0
)
(p
ihe
i
(b
ih
) + 2z")  2z`"+
X
h2(a+1;:::a
0
)
p
ihe
i
(b
ih
))
 2z`"+
X
h2(a+1;:::a
0
)
v
ih
:
Hence, the dierence between the increase in payments and the value of the extra objects
allocated is at most 2z`":
Proof of Lemma 8: Fix an arbitrary player i: Let
b
o
i
(e; b; v)[h] 
`
X
a
i
=h
o
0
(e; b; v)[a
i
]
be the probability that i ends up with h or more objects given (e; b; v). Let T
i
be the
event that i is involved in a tie given equilibrium play. Let T
buy
ih
be the subset of T
i
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Note that we have only sorted out those (e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) such that b
0
i
has h
th
element x: It is of course
trivial from to sort out which (e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) get mapped into any given ` vector from X:
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such that b
ih
is a buy oer involved in a tie and
b
o
i
(e; v; b)[h] < 1. So, T
buy
ih
is the set of
events where i's h
th
bid is involved in a tie and i does not get an h
th
object for sure,
given at least one of b
ih
> 0; v
ih
> 0. Suppose that Pr(T
buy
ih
) > 0 under m
0
. By Lemma
19, Pr(b
ih
2 Y
i
jT
buy
ih
) = 1. By Lemma 5, Pr(v
ih
< p
ihe
i
(b
ih
) jT
buy
ih
) = 0: By atomlessness
(A4), Pr(v
ih
2 p
ihe
i
(Y
i
) jT
buy
ih
) = 0. It follows that Pr(v
ih
> p
ihe
i
(b
ih
) jT
buy
ih
) = 1:
Similarly, let T
sell
ih
be the subset of T
i
such that i's h
th
bid is a sell oer involved
in a tie and
b
o
i
(e; b; v)[h] > 0: Recalling that in our set up, a sale occurs when one's
bid is not accepted, this is the set of events where i's h
th
bid is involved in a tie, and
i does not sell object h for sure. By an argument analogous to that establishing that
Pr(v
ih
> p
ihe
i
(b
ih
) jT
buy
ih
) = 1, it follows that Pr(v
ih
< p
ihe
i
(b
ih
) jT
sell
ih
) = 1:
Dene
! 
X
f
hjPr
(
T
sell
ih
)
>0
g
Pr(T
sell
ih
)E(
b
o
i
(e; b; v)[h] (p
ihe
i
(b
ih
)  v
ih
) jT
sell
ih
)
+
X
f
hjPr
(
T
buy
ih
)
>0
g
Pr(T
buy
ih
)E((1 
b
o
i
(e; b; v)[h]) (v
ih
  p
ihe
i
(b
ih
)) jT
buy
ih
):
So, the rst term sums the probabilities of not making a sale on unit h; multiplied by the
minimum expected prot on that sale (under A7), and the second sum does the same
thing for purchases. If Pr(T
sell
ih
) or Pr(T
buy
ih
) is positive for any i; h; then ! is positive.
Suppose ! > 0: Consider changing m
i
to m Æ  
"
i
, for " small. It gains at least ! by
transforming
b
o
i
(e; b; v)[h] to 0 (which, recall, means that i sells his h
th
object for sure)
when a sell bid b
ih
would have been involved in a tie, and
b
o
i
(e; b; v)[h] to 1 when a buy
bid b
ih
would have been involved in a tie. And, as argued above, it does almost as well
as m
i
in terms of the trading price on objects which would have traded anyway, and on
any new trades created beyond those from converting what were originally ties. So, this
deviation is strictly protable for " suÆciently small.
The proof of Lemma 10 uses the following lemma.
Let c
i
(e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) be the distance between (e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) and W
i
: c
i
is of course continuous.
Dene C
i
(m
i
) as the expectation of c
i
(:) given m
i
:
Lemma 20 Let o and m be arbitrary. For each i; and for each " > 0; there is a strategy
m

i
such that C(m

i
) < " and such that (m

i
; m
 i
; o)  (m; o)  ":
Proof of Lemma 20: First replace m
i
by m
0
i
as given by Lemma 7 such that m
0
i
is tie-free for i; and such that 
i
(m
0
i
; m
 i
; o)  
i
(m
i
; m
 i
; o)   "=2: Consider !
i
Æ m
0
i
as given in A10. Under o
S
(standard tie-breaking) this does weakly better, so that

i
(!
i
Æ m
0
i
; m
 i
; o
S
)  
i
(m
0
i
; m
 i
; o
S
): And, of course, C
i
(m
0
i
) = 0: Now, conceivably,
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!i
(m
0
i
) is not tie-free. Once again using Lemma 7, let m

i
be a tie free strategy for i close
enough to !
i
(m
0
i
); such that 
i
(m

i
; m
 i
; o
S
)  
i
(!
i
(m
0
i
); m
 i
; o
S
)   "=2; and such that
C
i
(m

i
)  ": Then,

i
(m

i
; m
 i
; o) = 
i
(m

i
; m
 i
; o
S
)
 
i
(!
i
(m
0
i
); m
 i
; o
S
)  "=2
 
i
(m
0
i
; m
 i
; o
S
)  "=2
= 
i
(m
0
i
; m
 i
; o)  "=2
 
i
(m
i
; m
 i
; o)  ":
Proof of Lemma 10: First, let us argue that m must have support in W
i
for all i.
Suppose not, so that for some bidder i; m
i
puts positive weight outside W
i
: But, using
Lemma 20, there is m

i
such that C(m

i
) < C(m
i
)=3 and such that (m

i
; m
 i
; o) 
(m; o)  C(m
i
)=3; and so m

i
does strictly better in G than m
i
:
Second, let us argue that m is in fact an equilibrium of the original game. Assume
not, so that for some i; there is m
0
i
such that 
i
(m
0
i
; m
 i
; o) > ", for some " > 0: Then,
applying Lemma 20 once again, note that there is m

i
such that C(m

i
) < "=3 and such
that (m

i
; m
 i
; o)  (m; o)  "=3: But then, m

i
also does strictly better in G than m
i
;
a contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 14: First, let us argue that there exists a monotone pure strategy
equilibrium for a modied version of the auction. Modify our auction as follows. Add a
small probability that the seller's (player 0's) endowment takes on any value between 0
and n`; that he sets a zero reserve price, and that there is additional bidder who enters the
auction and randomly makes 2n` bids with an atomless full support on admissible bids.
Trivial extensions of Theorems 6 and 9 admit this modication. Thus, there exists an
undominated

equilibrium of the modied game which does not involve any competitive
ties and remains an equilibrium under any omniscient and eectively trade-maximizing
tie-breaking rule.
Consider an arbitrary agent i, and let us argue that agent i's strategy must be mono-
tone and pure.
We start with the following claim.
Claim 21 Let v
0
i
and v
i
be such that v
0
ih
> v
ih
for all h, and b
0
i
be a best response for v
0
i
;
and b
i
a best response for v
i
: Then b
0
i
 b
i
:
Proof of Claim 21: Suppose to the contrary that b
0
ih
< b
ih
for at least one h. We will
argue that this leads to a contradiction.
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By Theorem 9, we know that the equilibrium is still an equilibrium if we choose a
tie-breaking rule such that i loses any competitive ties. So, let us assume that this is the
tie-breaking rule.
Next, due to the added uncertainty of the aggregate endowment and the presence of
the extra bidder, we know that any change of b
ih
leads to a change in the probability of
winning an h
th
object. Under the tie-breaking rule where i loses all competitive ties, a
change in b
ih
, leaving i's other bids unchanged, does not change the probability that i
wins at least h  1 objects, or at least h+ 1 objects. Thus, under (A8
0
), we can write i's
expected payo given (e
i
; v
i
; b
i
) in the following way:
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X
h
v
ih
P
ih
(b
ih
)
!
  E [T
i
(e; b)je
i
; b
i
] ;
where P
ih
(b
ih
) is the probability of winning at least h objects given i's h
th
bid.
Choose a contiguous set of indexes H = fh
L
;    ; h
H
g such that b
0
ih
< b
ih
for h 2 H;
while b
0
ih
 b
ih
for h 2 fh
L
  1; h
H
+ 1g the two bids immediately to either side of
H (except if H contains either 0 or `): Then, note that d
0
i
, dened by starting from b
0
i
and raising bids in H to b
ih
is a valid bid vector, because b
0
ih
L
 1
 b
ih
L
 1
: Similarly, d
i
;
dened by starting from b
i
and lowering bids in H to b
0
ih
is a valid bid vector, because
b
0
ih
H
+1
 b
ih
H
+1
:
Since b
i
is a best response at v
i
;
X
h
v
ih
P
ih
(b
ih
)  E (T
i
(e; b
 i
; b
i
)) 
X
h
v
ih
P
ih
(d
ih
)  E (T
i
(e; b
 i
; d
i
)) :
And, since only bids in H have changed, and since the tie breaking rule has i always lose
competitive ties, it follows that
X
h2H
v
ih
(P
ih
(b
ih
)  P
ih
(d
ih
))  E (T
i
(e; b
 i
; b
i
)  T
i
(e; b
 i
; d
i
))
and so, since d
ih
= b
0
ih
on H
X
h2H
v
ih
(P
ih
(b
ih
)  P
ih
(b
0
ih
))  E (T
i
(e; b
 i
; b
i
)  T
i
(e; b
 i
; d
i
)) (2)
Similarly, since b
0
i
is a best response at v
0
i
X
h
v
0
ih
P
ih
(b
0
ih
)  E (T
i
(e; b
 i
; b
0
i
)) 
X
h
v
ih
P
ih
(d
0
ih
)  E (T
i
(e; b
 i
; d
0
i
))
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Note that T
i
may not be dened in situations where i is involved in a competitive tie. However,
given the tie-breaking rule such that i always loses competitive ties and the continuity of the t
i
's, we
can easily extend T
i
to be dened at the (measure 0) set of points where i is involved in a competitive
tie by approximating with bids from \below".
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and so
X
h2H
v
0
ih
(P
ih
(b
0
ih
)  P
ih
(d
0
ih
))  E (T
i
(e; b
 i
; b
0
i
)  T
i
(e; b
 i
; d
0
i
))
from which
X
h2H
v
0
ih
(P
ih
(b
0
ih
)  P
ih
(b
ih
))  E (T
i
(e; b
 i
; b
0
i
)  T
i
(e; b
 i
; d
0
i
)) (3)
Adding 3 to 2, one obtains
X
h2H
(v
ih
  v
0
ih
) (P
ih
(b
ih
)  P
ih
(b
0
ih
)) (4)
 E (T
i
(e; b
 i
; b
i
)  T
i
(e; b
 i
; d
i
))  E(T
i
(e; b
 i
; d
0
i
)  T
i
(e; b
 i
; b
0
i
))
Now, since v
ih
< v
0
ih
for all h; and since b
ih
> b
0
ih
for all h 2 H; and since, given the
perturbation, any change in bid sometimes matters, the LHS of this expression is strictly
negative. However, by (A8
0
), the RHS of this expression is 0.
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This is a contradiction,
and so our supposition was incorrect.
Now let us complete the proof of the corollary. By Claim 21, along any line in agent
i's valuation space that passes through one valuation vector and another vector that
is strictly higher in each dimension, the best response correspondence is increasing the
strong sense that the smallest best response at v
0
> v is at least as large as the largest
best response at v. Thus, along any such line, there are at most a countable number
of points at which the best response correspondence is multi-valued. This implies that
the set of valuation vectors where the best response correspondence is multi-valued is of
`-dimensional Lebesgue measure 0. To see this, denote the set of such valuation vectors
by A. By Fubini's Theorem, write the `-dimensional Lebesgue measure of A as
Z
  
Z
I
A
(v
i1
; v
i2
; : : : ; v
i`
)dv
i1
  dv
i`
where I
A
is the indicator function. Without loss of generality for assessing the measure
of A, we can assume that it is any line where we vary only v
i1
that intersects A in at
most a countable number of points.
50
This implies that
Z
I
A
(v
i1
; v
i2
; : : : ; v
i`
)dv
i1
= 0
49
Note that while (A8
0
) only applies to a change in a single bid at a time, we can write the RHS of
(2) as a sum of changes of a single bid at a time iterating over the bids in H (here from highest indexed
to lowest), and similarly we can write the RHS of (3) as a sum of changes that involve only a single bid
in H at a time (here from lowest indexed to highest). Each h-th bid where h 2 H changes exactly once
in the corresponding sum in both cases, and so we can then apply (A8
0
).
50
For the purpose of determining whether A has positive Lebesgue measure, we can simply rotate the
set itself - so that lines that passed through it on a \45 degree" are now vertical in the v
i1
dimension.
We omit a change of notation where A is replaced by its rotation A
0
. Alternatively, one can do a change
of variables, and reach the same conclusion.
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for all (; v
i2
; : : : ; v
i`
). It follows that
Z
  
Z
I
A
(v
i1
; v
i2
; : : : ; v
i`
)dv
i1
  dv
i`
= 0:
Since the distribution of types is absolutely continuous with respect to `-dimensional
Lebesgue measure, this implies that the measure of types for which i's best response
is multi-valued is 0. Hence, by Claim 21, it follows that the equilibrium must be in
monotone pure strategies.
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Finally, let us now take the limit as the extra noise vanishes (along a subsequence if
necessary). By Theorem 2 in JSSZ, we obtain a monotone pure strategy undominated

equilibrium of the limit game; but possibly with a strange tie-breaking rule.
52
However,
from Theorem 9 we know that the equilibrium must not involve any competitive ties
and remains an equilibrium under any omniscient and eectively trade-maximizing tie-
breaking rule, including standard tie-breaking.
Proof of Theorem 15
Fix an auction A = (P; o; t; b
0
) satisfying A1-A13. For x 2 f3; 4; : : :g; consider an
auction A
x
modied from A as follows: With probability 1=x a non-strategic player
n+ 1 has e
n+1
= 1 and submits a sell oer which is uniform on [w;w]: With probability
1=x; e
n+1
= 0 and n + 1 submits a buy oer which is uniform on [w;w]: With residual
probability, player n + 1 is not involved. These events are independent of the events
under P .
It is a trivial extension of Theorem 6 that each A
x
has an undominated

equilibrium
m
x
. We show that there is  > 0 independent of x such that Pr (f trade under m
x
g) > 
for all x: By JSSZ Theorem 2 (which shows upper hemi-continuity of augmented equilib-
rium strategies and allocations as the parameters of the game change), any accumulation
point of fm
x
g is an (augmented) equilibrium of A that puts probability one on the clo-
sure of the set of undominated strategies in which the probability of trade is at least .
By Theorem 6, this is a standard equilibrium, and so we are done. (A proof of this step
via Reny is also possible.)
So, assume that there is no such : Then, there exists a subsequence of x such that
the probability of trade under the corresponding m
x
goes to 0 along the subsequence.
With a renaming, we can assume that trade goes to 0 along the original sequence.
For notational convenience, let Pr
x
(E) be the probability of event E happening in
auction x under m
x
. When the probability of an event does not depend on x; we write
simply Pr(E)
51
Given that we are dealing with distributional strategies, this is up to sets of measure 0, which is in
accordance with our denition of monotone pure strategies. One can change the strategies on the sets
of measure 0, if one likes.
52
Note that the set of pure monotone strategies is compact, and that when one takes limits of strategies
and outcomes, the limit tie-breaking rule may dier from those on the sequence, but will be an omniscient
one with which.
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Consider the case that condition (1) of A12 is satised. (The argument for the other
condition (2) is analogous.) Let H be the set of buyers for whom the max of the support
over buy values is w: Then, by atomlessness, there is ! > 0 such that for each i 2 H;
there is a probability of at least ! that there are at least ` + 1 sell values below w   !
among Nni; and such that for each i =2 H; i never has a buy value above w   !:
Consider an arbitrary k 2 f3; 4; : : :g; and let Æ < !=k: For i = 1; : : : ; n + 1; let Q
x
Bi
be the number of buy bids above w   2Æ that i makes. So,
fQ
x
Bi
> 0g = fe
i
< `; b
i;e
i
+1
> w   2Æg :
For each x; let

x
= max
i2H
Pr
x
fQ
x
Bi
> 0g
be the maximum probability that any player (other than n + 1) makes a buy bid above
w 2Æ inA
x
(by A13, the fact thatm
x
is undominated

and choice of !; Pr
x
(Q
x
Bi
> 0) = 0
for each player in NnH). Let i
x
be an associated maximizer of 
x
.
Let Q
x
B
=
P
n+1
i=1
Q
x
Bi
be the random variable giving the number of buy bids above
w   2Æ under m
x
by any player (including player n + 1): Let Q
x
S
be the number of sell
bids at or below w   2Æ by anyone other than i
x
(but including player n+ 1)
Let us rst argue that Pr
x
(Q
x
B
> 0) ! 0 must hold. To see this, suppose to the
contrary that everywhere along a subsequence, Pr
x
(Q
x
B
> 0) > ; for some  > 0: Let
j; j
0
be any two players who sometimes have a sell value below w   ! (two such players
exist, since there are sometimes at least ` + 1 sell values below w   !): Then, along a
subsequence, at least one of the players, say player j; assesses probability at least =2
that one of his opponents makes a buy bid above w 2Æ for each x: By Lemma 18, j thus
assigns probability at leastM
0
=2 of such a bid conditional on j having a sell value below
w !. Consider the strategy for j that whenever he has a sell value below w !, he bids
w   2Æ on that unit, and that he sets all other bids equal to value (thus guaranteeing a
non-negative prot on those units). Let 
j
be the probability of such a value for j:
Consider rst the case where j wins at least half the time when he bids w   2Æ and
one of his opponents makes a buy bid above w   2Æ: Then, by A13, his utility from this
strategy is at least

j
2
U(!   2Æ)M
0
=2:
But, as the utility of selling is bounded by U(w)   U(w) (since w is the most one will
ever receive, and the value of the unit sold is at least w); this implies that in equilibrium,
j is selling with probability bounded away from zero, contradicting that trade goes to
zero along the sequence.
Consider next the case where j wins less than half the time when he bids w  2Æ and
one of his opponents makes a buy bid above w   2Æ: This can only happen if at least
half the time that this occurs, there is another player making a sell bid below w   2Æ:
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But in this event, even under j's equilibrium strategy, at least one unit will have been
transferred. Hence, trade is occurring at least

j
M
0
=2
of the time, which again contradicts the fact that the probability of trade is going to
zero.
So, we have established that Pr
x
(Q
x
B
> 0) ! 0. Pr
x
(Q
x
S
> 0) ! 0 must also hold.
Assume not, so that Pr
x
(Q
x
S
> 0) >  > 0 along a subsequence. Choose a subsequence
along which i
x
is constant. Let Y
i
x
be the event that i
x
has a buy value above w  
Æ: Since i
x
2 H; Pr(Y
i
x
) > 0: Now, since Q
x
S
depends only on players other than i
x
;
Pr
x
(Q
x
S
> 0jY
i
x
) > M
0
; (once again using Lemma 18). So, consider the deviation for i
x
in which he bids w   2Æ whenever Y
i
x
holds, and bids his value otherwise (which under
A13 can never result in a loss). Then, we can argue as before: either i
x
wins at least half
the time that Q
x
S
> 0 and Y
i
x
are true, in which case his surplus (and hence equilibrium
probability of winning) are bounded away from 0; or i
x
wins less than half the time, in
which case the equilibrium amount of trade is bounded positive. Either is a contradiction.
Let ^
x
= max


x
;
1
x
2Æ
w w

> 0 be the maximum over probabilities that any player
(including player n+ 1) makes a buy oer greater than w   2Æ:
Note that Pr
x
(Q
x
B
> 0)  ^
x
and hence ^
x
must go to 0. Note also that
Pr
x
(Q
x
B
> 0) 
n+1
X
i=1
Pr
x
(Q
x
Bi
> 0)  n^
x
; (5)
since the second expression errs only in that it over-counts situations where Pr
x
(Q
x
Bi
> 0)
for more than one i:
The probability that q  2 players bid at or above w 2Æ is less than
n!
q!(n q)!
M
q 1
(^
x
)
q
;
where the factor M
q 1
takes account of the fact that once one knows that one (or more)
players have bid at or above w   2Æ; the likelihood of further such players may increase
to M
x
. It follows that
Pr
x
fQ
x
B
> `g < 

(^
x
)
2
+ (^
x
)
3
+ ::: + (^
x
)
n

where  < 1 accounts for both the combinatorial terms and a factor of M
n 1
. Since
Pr
x
fQ
x
B
> 0g  ^
x
, and since ^
x
! 0; it follows from the above inequality that
Pr
x
(Q
x
B
 `jQ
x
B
> 0)! 1: (6)
Choose a subsequence along which i
x
is constant. Let  be the probability that i
x
has
a buy value above w   2Æ: Since i
x
2 H;  > 0: Consider the deviation d
j
for any given
j 6= i
x
that whenever j has a sell value v
jh
below w   !; and the equilibrium species a
bid b
jh
above w   2Æ; j submits b
jh
= w   2Æ instead. We show that this is improving
for at least one j 6= i
x
.
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Consider the following set of events, measured relative to the equilibrium strategies.
The E's should be indexed by x, but we omit the notation.
E
0
1
: Q
x
Bi
x
> 0
E
00
1
: Q
x
B;n+1
> 0; i
x
has a buy value above w   2Æ:
E
2
: Q
x
S
= 0
E
3j
: Player j has an unsold unit with value below w   !; even though player j sells
strictly less than Q
x
B
objects.
E
4
: Q
x
B
 `
E
5
: There are at least `+ 1 sell values below w   ! among Nni
x
:
If ^
x
is maximized by i
x
; let E
1
= E
0
1
: If ^
x
is maximized by n+1; let E
1
= E
00
1
: Then,
in the rst case, Pr
x
(E
1
) = ^
x
; while in the second, Pr
x
(E
1
) = Pr(Q
B;n+1
> 0) Pr(i
x
has
a buy value above w   2Æ)  ^
x
; since player n + 1 is independent of the rest of the
system. In either case, Pr
x
(E
1
)  ^
x
:
Note that under either E
0
1
or E
00
1
; i
x
has a buy value above w   2Æ; and hence, since
marginal utility is decreasing and m
x
is undominated

, A13 implies that i
x
has no sell
bids at or below w   Æ. Under E
2
; no player other than i
x
has a sell bid at or below
w   2Æ either. Thus, under E
1
\ E
2
; there is no sell bid of w   2Æ or lower. So, under
E
1
\ E
2
\ E
3j
; j sells at least one extra object by d
j
. E
4
and E
5
are not necessary for j
to sell an extra object. Their role will become clear momentarily.
We claim that Pr
x
(E
2
jE
1
)! 1: To see this in the case of E
1
= E
0
1
; recall that we have
argued that Pr
x
(E
2
) ! 1; and hence Pr
x
(:E
2
) ! 0: But Pr
x
(:E
2
jE
1
)  M Pr
x
(:E
2
)
since E
2
involves only players other than i
x
; while E
0
1
only involves player i
x
: Hence
Pr
x
(:E
2
jE
1
)! 0, and so Pr
x
(E
2
jE
1
)! 1: In the case of E
00
1
; there is also the information
that player n + 1 bid at or above w   2Æ: This implies that n + 1 did not make any sell
bid. Since n+ 1 is independent of the rest of the players, the claim again follows.
Next, note that Pr
x
(E
5
jE
1
)  M
0
!; since Pr
x
(E
5
)  !; and since E
1
involves only
players i
x
and n+ 1; while E
5
involves neither of these players.
Finally, Pr
x
(E
4
jE
1
)! 1 by (6). Combining these, it follows that
Pr
x
(E
2
\ E
4
\ E
5
jE
1
) 
M
0
!
2
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for x suÆciently large (draw a Venn diagram), and hence
Pr(E
1
\ E
2
\ E
4
\ E
5
)

M
0
!
2
^
x
:
Thus, d
j
earns at least !   2Æ with probability at least
Pr
x
(E
1
\ E
2
\ E
3j
)
 Pr
x
(E
1
\ E
2
\ E
3j
\ E
4
\ E
5
)
 Pr
x
(E
3j
jE
1
\ E
2
\ E
4
\ E
5
)
M
0
!
2
^
x
:
On the other hand, lowering the sell bid on object h to w   2Æ can only result in a
worse outcome for j than the equilibrium strategy when j would already have sold object
h, which occurs with probability bounded by Pr
x
(Q
x
B
> 0): From 5, Pr
x
(Q
x
B
> 0)  n^
x
:
And, since w was the upper bound on buy values for players, and hence on their bids,
these objects would have sold for at most w; while under d
j
; they sell for at least w  2Æ:
So, the cost of d
j
in this event is at most `2Æ. Since the utility function has a bounded
derivative, there exists  < 1 such that U
0
(x)=U
0
(y) <  for all x and y: So, for the
deviation not the be protable, it must be that
Pr
x
(E
3j
jE
1
\ E
2
\ E
4
\ E
5
)
M
0
!
2
^
x
(!   2Æ)  n^
x
`2Æ
Dividing both sides by ^
x
Æ (which is valid, because ^
x
is positive thanks to player
n+ 1); and summing across players other than i
x
;
M
0
!
2


!
Æ
  2

X
j 6=i
x
Pr
x
(E
3j
jE
1
\ E
2
\ E
4
\ E
5
)  (n  1)n`2:
But, in any realization where E
1
\ E
2
\ E
4
\ E
5
holds, E
3j
must hold for at least one
j 6= i
x
; since there are ` + 1 sell values below w   2Æ; since no sell bid is at or below
w  2Æ; and since there are at most ` buy oers above w  2Æ (it is for this purpose that
E
4
and E
5
were maintained). Integrating across realizations,
X
j 6=i
x
Pr
x
(E
3j
jE
1
\ E
2
\ E
4
\ E
5
)  1;
and so
M
0
!
2


!
Æ
  2

 (n  1)n2`Æ:
Recall that k 2 f3; 4; : : :g is arbitrary and that Æ was chosen so that !=k > Æ. It follows
that
M
0
!
2
 (k   2)  (n  1)n2`
!
k
:
This equation is clearly false for k suÆciently large, and we have a contradiction.
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